

MORALES FOUR YEARS LATER

*The influence of Identity Politics
on the Political Culture of students in
Bolivia*



Miet Chielens

Morales: Four Years Later

**The Influence of Identity Politics on the Political Culture
of Students In Bolivia.**

Miet Chielens
0504661

Master Thesis Development Studies
Supervisor Dr. F. Schuurman

Radboud University Nijmegen

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reface

It is with great pleasure and pride that I present here my master's thesis about the political culture of students in Bolivia.

At various stages in its inception and development, many people have contributed to this dissertation, some consciously, others unwittingly.

In particular, I wish to acknowledge the kind cooperation of Frans Schuurman, whose positive attitude, constructive opinions and supportive conversations helped me a lot from the inception to the conclusion of this project. Thank you for your sustained belief in me and my research. Ton Salman shared with me his enormous knowledge about Bolivia, his critical reflections on my work and support during my field work. Ton, 'Gracias' for staying committed to this thesis, even though I was not a student at your university. Thanks also to Julian Putkowski for reading this thesis in its original draft form and drew attention to flaws in my written English.

My interest in this subject originated and developed during the course of long conversations about politics with my Bolivian friends and my host father, Hugo during my brief visits to Bolivia in 2006 and 2008. I especially appreciate the support of my Bolivian parents, who welcomed me with open arms whenever I came to stay and I am proud to have been included as part of your family.

This thesis would not exist without all the people in Bolivia who gave me their time, energy and answers. I hope they will find their voice somewhere in this thesis and I wish they will never lose their hopes and dreams. More particularly, I thank Panchi for the many books he gave me and for his contribution concerning the subject and my Bolivian *hermanos* and *hermanas*, especially: Gabriela for the many talks about my research; Martin for being the most wonderful housemate I could ever imagine; Elmer and Paolo for warm hugs and many laughs; Toni for being the crazy person he is; *compañeros* Juan and Diego for sharing dreams with me; Tati for believing in me when I forgot to believe in myself, and los Atajos for making every weekend unforgettable with their inspiring music. *Les llevo en mi corazón cada día de mi vida. Miles de gracias!*

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Last but not least, I thank my parents for their continual trust, support and patience, and my brother Kobe and sisters, Trui and Anne for the necessary relief and distraction when times were tough.

This thesis is dedicated to Abraham Bojorquez († 22 May 2009), whose message hopefully will keep to inspire young people to believe in a better future for themselves and Bolivia.

Esta tesis se ha hecho en el ámbito de aplicación de la maestría ‘Estudios de Desarrollo’ en la Universidad de Nimega, Holanda. Mi interés y afinidad con el proceso del ‘gran cambio’ desde Evo Morales se convirtió en presidente, me convenció de hacer esta investigación.

El tema central de esta tesis es la influencia de la política de identidad en la cultura política de los estudiantes en La Paz y El Alto. La polarización étnica, regional y social ha aumentado desde la presidencia de Morales en 2006. Algunos dicen que su enfoque por la política de identidad ha contribuido a esta polarización. Con esta investigación me propongo dar información sobre el impacto de la política de identidad en la sociedad Boliviana. Es importante darse cuenta que hay que ver este impacto dentro de un auto-reforzante círculo y no en la perspectiva del ‘causa’ y ‘efecto’.

En el capítulo teórico he explicado los conceptos más relevantes en relación con el tema de la tesis. He utilizado la teoría de Leonardo Avritzer (2002) para explicar la situación en Bolivia como ejemplo de la democratización y la democracia del espacio público. La teoría de la cultura política de Almond y Verba (1965) fue utilizado para dividir la cultura política en cuatro dimensiones: (i) la identidad nacional, (ii) la identificación con otros ciudadanos, (iii) gestión política y (iv) el proceso de hacer decisiones en el gobierno. Porque en mi opinión era importante para integrar a las acciones políticas para tener una buena vista sobre la cultura política, he usado el modelo ‘CAP’ para combinar Conocimiento, Actitud y Práctica con respeto a la política en el mismo modelo.

La política de identidad es otro concepto muy importante en esta tesis que tiene que ser entendida como todas las formas de acción política con el objetivo el progreso de los intereses de un grupo de población en cuál todos los miembros comparten la misma identidad o etnia (Isin and Wood, 1999). En el caso de Bolivia, la política de identidad ha sido utilizado en la acción política del Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) y ha crecido hasta el nivel del estado ya que el líder del MAS se convirtió en el presidente de Bolivia. Con un programa política para incluir al los pueblos indígenas en el ámbito político y darles más derechos especiales que se basan en su propia cultura y etnia, Evo Morales ganó las elecciones de una manera muy convincente.

A través de la información que fue recopilada principalmente por los 300 encuestas hecho en la Universidad Privada Boliviana, la Universidad Mayor de San Andrés y la Universidad Pública de El Alto traté de averiguar cómo la política de identidad influye la cultura política de los estudiantes en La Paz y El Alto. Entrevistas personales con estudiantes y expertos me ayudaban a entender mejor el tema de la política Boliviana y su impacto en la sociedad.

Los resultados de esta investigación están escritos en tres capítulos empíricos. La primera describe la cultura política de los estudiantes de La Paz y El Alto y de cómo la cultura política está influenciada por los indicadores de la identidad clase, etnicidad y género. El segundo capítulo empírico explica la influencia de la política de identidad Boliviana en las tres dimensiones de modelo CAP. El último capítulo se describe la opinión de los estudiantes acerca la política de identidad.

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A **bbreviations**

CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
EU	European Union
FBDM	Fundación Boliviana para la Democracia Multipartidaria
MAS	Movimiento al Socialismo
MNR	Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario
NGO	Nongovernmental Organisation
Podemos	Poder Democratico y Social
POR	Partido Obrero Revolucionario
UMSA	Universidad Mayor de San Andres
UN	Unión Nacional
UNASUR	Unión de Naciones Suramericanas
UPB	Universidad Privada Boliviana
UPEA	Universidad Pública de El Alto



Introduction

In his inaugural address as president of Bolivia, Evo Morales insisted that the central project of his government would be the struggle against both the colonial and racist State and the neo-liberal economic model, which he felt to be responsible for the miserable living conditions of the majority of the Bolivians, in particular the indigenous population. He stated:

Estamos acá para decir, basta a la resistencia. De la resistencia de 500 años a la toma del poder para 500 años, indígenas, obreros, todos los sectores para acabar con esa injusticia, para acabar con esa desigualdad, para acabar sobre todo con la discriminación, opresión donde hemos sido sometidos como Aymaras, Quechuas, Guaraníes¹.

Morales devoted much of his speech to recall what he termed the ‘black history’ of Bolivia, characterized by marginalization of the country’s indigenous population. According to the latest census (2001), 62.2% of the Bolivian population is composed of indigenous people but in spite of being the majority they have been despised and suffered great discrimination; 50 years ago indigenous people were forbidden access to the Plaza Murillo² and they were not even allowed to make their way along sidewalks. Morales declared that his government would try to change this historical marginalization but not out of revenge because, as he made explicitly clear, Bolivia’s Indians were not spiteful people.

After three years in office, Evo Morales continues to work hard to make his promises come true but Bolivia continues to experience economic instability and he has to contend with problems that persist between the various ethnic groups that make up Bolivia’s population. As a result of Morales’ policy initiatives favouring indigenous peoples, the *mestizo*³ and white population of Bolivia does not identify themselves with their president and maintain that Morales is not capable of being the president of all Bolivians.

At the beginning of September 2008, the conflict between indigenous on the one hand and mestizo and white population at the other hand escalated when armed civil committees supported by the right-wing governors of the eastern departments acted in a violent fashion and occupied important government buildings. In the northern province of Pando, the situation was very grave; more than 60 people were killed by the armed gangs operating under the leadership of the governor, and more than 100 people were reported missing. Eyewitnesses reported that the gangs shot and persecuted indigenous citizens, including children and pregnant women and children (Ojalá, Bolivia Ahora Blog, comment posted September 1, 2008). Bolivia subsequently attracted the attention of the international media when President Morales decided to expel the United States ambassador because of the latter’s involvement in the violent unrest. The problems of the poor South American country became important, not only for human rights organizations like Amnesty International but

¹ Translation: ‘We are here to say stop to the resistance. From 500 years of resistance to 500 years of power [for] the indigenous population, labourers, every sector; to end the injustice, to end that inequality, especially to end with discrimination [and] oppression where we have been subjected as Aymara, Quechuas and Guaraníes.’ (Translated by author)

² The central plaza in La Paz, the location of the capital city’s the principal government buildings, including the presidential palace.

³ People of mixed racial ancestry

also for the European Union, which tried to mediate between the government and opposition groups, seeking to establish a peace settlement.

Although there is much information in the media about this violent period in Bolivia, it is very hard to find a substantial body of politically impartial studies about the Bolivia's problems. Without or perhaps also because of the associated gap in our knowledge, it is important to examine how the civil and political conflict has affected the Bolivian population. The polarization that had long been evident, affecting relationships between Bolivia's ethnic communities, regional structures and social classes appeared to become more intense after Morales was elected and lessons from recent political history (e.g. Yugoslavia during the 1990's) draws attention to the dangerous and bloody consequences of political polarization on a number of different levels.

Using data from an original research carried out in Bolivia, this thesis presents an informed view about the impact on the political culture of Bolivian students of government policies intended to improve the lives of indigenous communities. As well as contributing to the comparatively small amount of scientific literature about Bolivia's political crisis, it is also intended to add to the more general literature about new forms of democratization in Latin America.

Recent thinking on the process of democratization in Latin America has been advanced by Avritzer's democracy theory of the public space which. Avritzer's theory focuses on the emergence of social movements and their importance in achieving democratic change in many Latin American countries, and Morales' project can be regarded as near perfect example of the democratization process, as formulated by Avritzer in his book 'Democracy and The Public Sphere in Latin America' (Avritzer 2002).

Since 22 January 2006, it has become clear that Bolivian social movements based on ethnicity have made a hitherto unprecedented impact on central policy generation and development. This is partly because after decades of oppression by Bolivia's white and mestizo elite the country elected a president who represents and identifies strongly with the indigenous majority. After a long struggle against neo-liberal governments, basing his policies on certain forms of identity politics, Morales aimed to bring the indigenous population into the democratic system and by doing so he wishes to democratize the Bolivian political system.

Morales has not been the only president in Latin America who had pursued a policy linked to emancipation of the indigenous inhabitants. The policies of the socialist president of Ecuador, Rafael Correa, have also primarily concerned with promoting economic relief and better social integration of the Ecuadorian poor, who are also mostly indigenous people. In addition to Correa and Morales is Hugo Chavez, president of Venezuela, who is famous for his commitment to improving the lives of the poor via a political doctrine of participatory democracy, socialism and pan-Latin American cooperation. All three presidents strongly criticize neo-liberalism, the negative aspects of globalization, and the foreign policy of the United States. Although this thesis focuses on the identity politics of Morales, it is very clear that the public statements and activities of all three presidents show that a new form of democratization is emerging in Latin America.

This thesis will examine the impact of Morales' identity politics as an important aspect of the democratization of the public space in Bolivia. In doing so, it is also intended to make a contribution to the scholarly literature about the effects of the democratization of the public sphere on people and the society.

In order to test whether Avritzer's theory about democratization of the public sphere might be applied to current developments in Bolivia, I decided to collect data in Bolivia, and specifically to concentrate research on university students and the relationship between their political culture and the evolution and promotion of the identity politics of by the Morales'

government. Students were selected as the target group for research because they tend to be articulate and more informed about political developments than the mass of the population. It was also felt that students as respondents would have fewer reservations about expressing opinions about the policy making process and their own and others’ political activities. These views were a consequence of prior contact with Bolivian students, and reflected the personal conviction that because of their interest in politics, the findings would be easier to analyse. This was not only in relation to sentiments about politicians and national policies but also their ideological beliefs.

The original research was carried out between January and April 2009 at two universities in La Paz and one university in El Alto. In order to better contextualize influence of the politics of identity on the political beliefs of students, care was taken to include individuals from different social classes and ethnic backgrounds. Great efforts were made to gather a representative sample of students but also because I wished to have a better idea of the extent to which ethnicity features, generally and specifically, in deciding their support or opposition to Evo Morales, and which specific factors of the identity politics influence this choice. I also wished to find out how the political culture of students was formed and whether it has change during the three years of Morales’ rule and expected to find that the political culture changed in direction of more extreme beliefs on both sides. I also considered that the identity politics, which can be seen as principal effect of the democratization of the public sphere, and the problems it has generated are the principal reasons why people became more extreme in their thoughts and actions. The growth of political extremism is always very dangerous for the continued existence of a country like Bolivia.

Of course, it is too idealistic to think that this research may encourage the mutual understanding among these young people but at least this thesis tries to give an objective view about the different ways of thinking, acting and voting, and how and why these students’ attitudes have developed.

To gain an insight about the role of identity politics in the political culture, it is necessary to refer a range of theories that help conceptualisation, including political culture, identity politics and identity markers. The first chapter, on ‘theoretical and analytical reflections’ gives a critical view of on these concepts, which are further explored and analysed, and linked to the analytical scheme based on the KAP-model. Chapter 2 on ‘methodology’ explains how I gathered material and analysed my research data. Chapter 3 describes the context and background of the political situation in Bolivia and finally, chapters 4, 5, and 6 develop and clarify the findings on political culture of students; the way they think about identity politics in Bolivia and role these identity politics play in the formation of their political culture.



Theoretical and Analytical Reflections

This chapter elaborates the most important theories underlying the subject of political culture and identity politics in Bolivia. After a brief explanation about the democratization processes in Latin America and its importance for the construction of this research, the key concepts of this research will be defined: political culture and identity politics.

The best-known theory of political culture during the C20th was published by Almond & Verba in 1965. Although it was not particularly innovative, it appeared to be the most easily applicable theory that could be used for this research because of the comprehensive way in which Almond and Verba identified the dimension and divisions of political culture. Their theoretical formulation was also very influential, as can be seen from many studies about political cultures all over the world during the late C20th.

Political culture can be understood as the way people think and feel about politics, and the way they act in relation to politics. This way of thinking can be influenced by many different factors, including the impact on political culture of identity politics. Identity politics is characterized by a policy based on advancing the interests of a particular group of people in the society who share a common (ethnic) identity. Identity politics have always played a part in Bolivia’s history but with Morales’ beliefs, his election as the first indigenous president and his policies, identity politics have become even more crucially important.

1.1 Democratization Theories in Latin America

The traditional view of many scholars to explain democratization processes in Latin America has been to relocate the theory of ‘democratic elitism’ from Western Europe to Latin America. This theory is based on two main hypotheses: (i) in order to maintain democracy, it is necessary to narrow the scope of political participation, and (ii) the only way to make democratic decision-making rational is to limit it to elites and restrict the role of the masses to that of choosing between elites (Avritzer 2002:14-15). However, the theory of democratic elitism failed to fully explain emergence of democracy in Latin America during the 1980s, and other established theories fell short in explaining the phenomenon. In addition to challenging the validity of the theory of democratic elitism, the Brazilian theorist, Leonardo Avritzer, has developed his own democracy theory, drawing inspiration from the principles of the public sphere theory formulated by Jürgen Habermas (1989).

Habermas states that the public sphere is a space for the free interaction of groups, associations and movements which creates a third path within democracy theory beyond the debate between democratic elitism and participatory democrats. The third path is a new connection between reason and will in which reason results from the public debate in a sphere that is located between the market and the state. As such, the basic belief of the public sphere theory is that political action is steered by the public sphere and the only valid governments are those that listen to the public sphere. ‘An active public sphere separated from public administration becomes the place where issues are thematized, new identities are presented, and institutional innovation emerges’ (Avritzer 2002:39).

In his book *‘Democracy and the Public Sphere in Latin America’*, Avritzer (2002) explains the necessity for replacing the elite-mass duality with his own concept of the ‘democratic public space’. Only in this way, he argues, it is possible to understand the recent

democratization processes in Latin America. Avritzer’s book completely rejects mainstream Western ideas about democratization, including the theory of ‘democratic elitism’ (Schumpeter, Downs, Dahl, Weber in Avritzer, 2002). According to Avritzer (2002), democratization does not take place at the level of elite politics but on the level of non-elite public sphere: social movements, rights-based protests and nongovernmental organisations (NGOs). Via his examination of democratization processes in Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico Avritzer concluded out that social movements have been the key actors responsible for the processes of democratization in Latin America, not the elite dominated political sphere⁴. He acknowledges major political obstacles to democratization in Bolivia and the rest of Latin America are the antidemocratic political culture, dominated by corruption as well as antidemocratic non-elite political movements. However, according to Avritzer (2002), the development of democratization is challenged by the lack of effective institutional linkages between the public and the political sphere.

The literature about Latin American democratization and Avritzer’s democracy theory assist understanding of the importance of social movements in the Bolivian political sphere. Looking at the efforts of democratization in Bolivia over the last three decades, social movements can be seen as playing a crucial role in this process of democratization, especially in relation to the emergence of new indigenous movements (Assies and Salman 2005). The latter were significant in revitalizing civil society and involving excluded people in the public sphere (Assies and Salman 2005). These new indigenous movements in particular were the first actors that called attention to the situation of marginalized and oppressed ethnic groups in Bolivia. These emergent social movements will be further explored in relation to identity politics but it is initially enough to state that their role and activities influenced the adoption of multicultural policies by the Bolivian state.

1.2 Political Culture

The concept of political culture can be most simply understood as the expression used to explain people’s attitude and behaviour towards politics; identity politics expressed at the level of social movements can be seen as part of a people’s political culture. In Bolivia on the other hand, identity politics is not only practiced at the level of the civil society but also at the national level, as part of the state’s policies. The latter thesis is built on the theoretical formulation of political culture expressed by Avritzer, and his conclusions about the connection between culture and political culture in Latin America. Thus the emergence of Bolivian democracy to occupy the public space, characterised by face-to-face interaction and moral criticism of the state, may therefore be regarded as connecting both culture and political culture (Avritzer 2002:58).

During his research on democracy in Latin America, Avritzer (2002) had some difficulties in situating democracy in the Latin American political tradition. One of his main questions on the theme of building democracy outside the western world was to query what role ‘culture’ plays in the democratization process. Political culture has been analyzed in social and political theory as the way in which ‘ideas’ influence social action. Weber (in Avritzer 2002:58) calls these ideas ‘world views’ and explains the concept of political culture as the manner in which individuals incorporate complex systems of ideas (world views) and how the assimilation might influence the political attitude of individuals. Avritzer (58) defines political culture as the public struggle over the meaning of political practices that will

⁴ Definition political sphere: a sphere of intense political activity. (Kramers Dictionary). So, political sphere can be understood as the sphere of elections, political parties, and state bureaucracies.

determine new institutional behaviours in the polity. Avritzer maintains that all societies have a dominant political culture and that in every society, through actions at the public level, there are ways to challenge the dominant political culture. The hegemonic political culture in Latin America was formed because of the failure of Iberian traditions and institutions to generate an alternative set of political institutions in spite of its early rejection of liberalism and political equality.

Avritzer’s ideas about political culture differ significantly from the classic work on political culture written by Almond and Verba (1965). The latter’s concept of political culture has two main characteristics: (i) it involves individual attitudes towards political objects, and (ii) it is the result of incorporation of available cultural patterns or world views. Almond and Verba, unlike Avritzer, regard culture as a category belonging to the individual personality and that culture is formed in the mind of people. Avritzer, on the contrary, sees culture as a phenomenon, essentially associated with the realm of social practices (Avritzer 2002:58). Even allowing for Avritzer’s critique of Almond and Verba’s theory, the latter’s model of analysis remains useful because of their clear and accessible explanation of four different dimensions. These dimensions were initially associated with ‘political culture’, identified and explored during the 1950’s by Gabriel Almond (1956) and during the 1960’s by Verba.

Almond wrote about ‘political culture’ in his seminal article about ‘Comparative Political Systems’, observing that every political system was embedded in a particular pattern of orientation to political action. He defined political culture as a system of empirical beliefs, expressive symbols and values which define the situation in which political action takes place. The study of political culture, according to Almond remains a study of political beliefs and focuses on basic values, cognition and emotional commitments. Almond’s perspectives were taken up by Sidney Verba in *‘Political Culture and Political Development’* (Pye & Verba, 1965), in which Verba described some significant dimensions of political culture. Verba’s understanding was based on earlier work of Gabriel Almond: *‘The civic culture’* (1965). The focal points of these dimensions were embodied by the basic political values representing general beliefs about political activity; the nature of the political process, as well as the place of the individual within the political process. The four dimensions consisted of : (i) national identity, (ii) identification with one’s fellow citizens, (iii) governmental output and (iv) the process of decision making.

In the first dimension (Almond and Verba 1965) is concerned with an individuals’ identification with the nation-state. It embraces individual’s beliefs and the extent to which they consider themselves as members of the nation-state, and raises the issue of whether individuals who are physical and legal members of a political system are also are psychological members of that system. When political change has taken place in a country, the issue of identity becomes extremely important. Thus, when members of a political system have a strong and positive identification with the nation, developments have a better chance of success. For many relatively ‘new’ nations of the world, political symbols oppose or challenge local affiliations; loyalty to some sub-national units may be a major source of cultural conflicts within a nation. No less importantly, uncertainty about identity may be one of the most important defining characteristics of a political culture.

The second dimension is closely related to the first one because it also deals with identification. While national identification is about the sense of attachment that individuals have with a superior political unit and the associated symbols of authority; this dimension is about one’s identification with fellow citizens. However, the extent to which individuals feel integrated with the other people inhabiting the same political system remains a conundrum. There are also related issues, involving individuals’ trust and confidence in the motives and behaviour of their fellow political actors, e.g. individuals’ distrust generates unease about the

transfer of government power to their political opponents. Conversely, when people are involved in competing peacefully with political rivals, they don't tend to be threatened by the alternation of power between leaders, so confidence in other political actors is a crucial element of a democratic political culture. Fundamental trust limits the perceived danger of alternation of power and enhances the feeling that they are all members of the same community.

The third dimension is less general than the previous ones because it involves beliefs about how the political order operates and expectations about what a government should do for the members of a system. These beliefs about the perceived desirability of governmental activities are particularly significant when assessing the effectiveness and stability of a political system.

The final dimension of political culture relates to beliefs about the process of decision-making of the government. In many societies people define themselves as subjects of the government rather than authentic participants. Consequently, it means that people are uninterested in how and why policy making decisions are made, rather than the outcome of the process. In addressing this dimension beliefs about the role of members of a society in the political process are important.

A quick overview on these four dimensions suggests that national identity and identification with one's fellow citizens can be used to locate, evaluate and analyse people's political attitudes. More specifically, the dimensions relating to governmental output and political decision-making can be used to assess how much knowledge individuals have about the body politic. To the four dimensions of Almond & Verba (1965), allied with Avitser's views on political culture, it is useful to add a fifth dimension: practice. This fifth dimension is intended to yield more information about political activity, ranging from voting in elections, talking part in political demonstrations, active membership of a political party.

1.3 Identity Politics

Identity politics became more important in international politics after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. Capitalist ideologues, e.g. Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stanislaw (1998) argued that capitalism and democracy had defeated socialism. Others, including Francis Fukuyama, in his book *The End of History and the Last Man* (1992) went further, suggesting that 1989 signified not only the victory of political and economic liberalism but also an end to ideology. Fukuyama's latter assertion was premature because a new form of political ideology has emerged, partially informed by principles traditionally associated with socialism (redistribution and equality) but essentially a manifestation of neo-nationalism. During the 1990's and the early C21st, neo-nationalist politics emerged in countries where hitherto subordinated elements of the population demanded rights varying from the affirmation of group difference to demands for greater political representation. In Latin America subordinate groups confronted the domination and oppression of capitalism, challenging established beliefs associated with democracy, developments and unsettling US conservatives, including Samuel Huntington. However, instead of legitimating their demands via Marxist Leninism, emergent groups invoked principles of 'universal citizenship' and 'equality before the law', and while some groups had clear ethnic affiliations, others were concerned with non-ethnic issues. This political action to advance the interests of a group whose members perceived themselves to be oppressed by virtue of a shared, marginalized identity, including race, ethnicity, gender, religion or sexual orientation is referred to generally as 'identity politics'.

Over the past twenty years, social movements representing identity politics formed effective blocs of resistance to capitalism (Isin and Wood 1999). Open debate on this issue is currently focused on the question whether identity politics could not only challenge injustice, inequality, domination and oppression but also provide an alternative to capitalism. In the book *‘Citizenship and Identity’* (Isin and Wood 1999) the authors present a well-expressed definition of ‘cultural politics’, drawing attention to three different forms: (i) ‘identity politics’, as used by movements striving to establish durable group identities; (ii) ‘politics of difference’, movements claiming rights on the basis of group difference and (iii) ‘multicultural politics’, more recent movements seeking to go beyond the tension between politics of identity and difference by including them both in a multicultural vision.

In his book about ethnicity and nationalism Eriksen (2002:185-161) pointed out three social and five cognitive features of identity politics which appear to be almost universal. The first of these features is animated by competition over scarce resources. Eriksen maintains that group conflicts in contemporary societies always involve perceptions of scarcity and struggles to retain or attain equality. He argues that successful mobilisations on the basis of collective identities presuppose a general belief that resources are unequally distributed along group lines. In this context resources should be interpreted in the widest possible sense. It can mean economic wealth, political power, recognition or symbolic power.

With reference to the second social feature, Eriksen maintains that modernisation actualises differences and triggers conflict. Because of the integration of formerly isolated groups into common economic and political systems, inequalities are clarified. Simultaneously, understanding of ethnicity identity and cultural differentiation enables comparisons to be made, which often triggers conflict.

The third characteristic of groups who practice identity politics is the fact that they are largely self-recruiting. Although biological self-reproduction is not essential in order to retain a strong collective identity, kinship is still an important organising principle for most societies.

These three characteristics were the social features of identity politics according to Eriksen. He also explains five cognitive features: Firstly, at the level of ideology, cultural similarity overrules social equality. Group members see themselves as a homogeneous group and they do not communicate about the internal differences. Secondly, members invoke images of past suffering and injustice in order to legitimate revenge. Thirdly, political symbolism and rhetoric are directly associated with members’ personal life experiences; myths, cultural symbols and kinship terminology are used in addressing supporters with collective goal of reducing the difference between personal experience and group history. The fourth cognitive feature is the essentially historic contrast between first-comers and subsequent arrivals or invaders. This is not universal in identity politics but it is still used whenever possible. Fifth and final feature is that social complexity in society is reduced to a set of simple contrasts. Collective identity must be based on relatively unambiguous criteria such as place, religion, mother-tongue or kinship.

The eight features explained above are almost perfectly appropriate for analysis of the recent developments in Bolivia. Identity politics in Bolivia arose because of the profound economic and political inequality that existed between the indigenous population and others (social feature 1). Social movements based on ethnicity work towards recognition for the indigenous population and better integration in the Bolivian society. Because of this integration and interaction between indigenous and other people (many indigenous people moved from the countryside to the bigger cities) differences became visible and as such people started to exercise comparisons with other groups (social feature 2). Based on kinship (children whose parents are Aymará are similarly classified), indigenous people started to focus on similarities and contrasts within the group. For example, the identity politics in

Bolivia are associated with generally remedying the disadvantages experienced by the indigenous population, it must also be noted that there are many different indigenous ethnicities, all with different traditions. However, homogeneity is effectively maintained by the collective belief that they are all the original inhabitants of Bolivia (social feature 3 and cognitive feature 1).

Identity politics in Bolivia were invoked by during the mobilisation of MAS (movement toward Socialism) and has matured since leader of MAS, Evo Morales became president of Bolivia. In his inauguration speech Morales promised the indigenous population that he would end to the suffering and discrimination they had experienced since the territory had been colonized by the Spanish conquistadores (cognitive feature 2). The enactment of government policy with reference to identity politics has been incorporated in Bolivia’s new Constitution (approved in January 2009). The new constitution concentrates on giving more rights and autonomy to the indigenous population: the 34 different ethnicities within the whole indigenous population group (cognitive feature 3). In the second chapter ‘Fundamental rights and guarantees’ of the new Constitution, article 30, 31 and 32 are dedicated to the special rights for *pueblos indígena originario campesinos*. This group of people is defined in the Constitution as the population group that shares a cultural identity, language, historical tradition, institutions, territorial application and ‘cosmovision’ established long before the occupation by the conquistadores. (Nueva Constitución Político del Estado 207:article 30.1). This element of the constitution most clearly approximates to Eriksen’s typology, specifically the contrast made between first-comers and invaders (feature 4). The box (box 1.1) below records the ten most important rights for the indigenous population that have been incorporated in the new Bolivian Constitution.

Box 1.1 Rights for <i>Pueblos Indígena Originario Campesinos</i> – Article 31
1. The right to their own cultural identity, religious conviction, spirituality, practices and customs, and their own cosmovision.
2. The right that the cultural identity of all the members, if they want so, to be inscribed alongside Bolivian citizenship on an ID-card, passport or any other form of identification document.
3. The right to protection of their sacred places.
4. The right for their traditional knowledge and skills, traditional medicines, languages, rituals and symbols and folkloric costumes to be valued, respected and fostered.
5. The right to an intracultural, intercultural, multilingual education throughout the educational system.
6. The right to a universal and free health system which respects their cosmovision and traditional practices.
7. The right to engage in political, judicial and economic activities according to their cosmovision.
8. The right to share of the benefits arising from the exploitation of natural resources in their territory.
9. The right on autonomous indigenous territorial supervision and the use and exploitation of renewable natural resources in their territory without disadvantaging the legitimate rights of third parties.
10. The right to participation in the institutions of the State.

Source: Nueva Constitución Política del Estado, 2007

Looking at what we know about identity politics so far, it is possible to imagine that the movements emerge because of a ‘clash of identities’, as originally expressed by James Littleton: “Many people are preoccupied with the attempt to fulfil their political aspirations by placing increasing emphasis on the particular social groups which they identify [...] Instead of regarding themselves as citizen of sovereign nation-states, much less [as] citizens of the world, many people have come to see themselves primarily as members of a racial, ethnic, linguistic, religious or gender group”(in Isin and Wood 1999:2). Identity politics questions the universal perception of citizenship (of a nation-state) by contrasting it with the multilayered concept of identity. In abstraction, citizenship is a model of membership of a territorially defined and state-governed society. It is argued that identity, on the other hand, is based on more enduring and all-pervasive factors, and identity politics that activate warm feelings of mutuality and ideals of community created from and within family and kinship relations. The juxtaposition can be dangerous when questions of identity become so critically important that citizenship and democracy totally disappears.

As for Bolivia, it became clear since the elections of 2005 that identity politics has continued to remain very popular with the majority of the population. This is partly because it already featured strongly in the mobilization of new indigenous movements in the 1990s, when identity became an important concept to promote the interests of highland peasantry and coca-growers on the political agenda of MAS. With a political programme to include the indigenous population in the political sphere and to grant them rights based on their own culture and ethnicity, Evo Morales won the elections with an overwhelming majority. During his three years as president (up till now) identity and citizenship have become important concepts in the legislative policies. Morales sometimes refers to citizenship – ‘We are all Bolivians’ – during his speeches and in other occasions he focuses on the indigenous identity. These switches can have more than simply linguistic or symbolic significance, and even though difficult to quantify, the implied synthesis is generally recognised and may have a great influence on the society, and especially on the way people think about the president and the government.

1.4 The KAP-model

The KAP-model in figure 1.1 is a behavioural model that has been extensively applied in the field of marketing, consumer studies and health communication campaign evaluations (Valente, Paredes and Poppe, 1998) and has been generally acknowledged to be an effective and reliable model to measure individual participation. The KAP-model is a classic learning model that is structured on the understanding that a person’s knowledge, attitude and practice are interrelated. The KAP model suggests learning usually progresses through a series of stages: first you learn about something, later on you form a (positive or negative) attitude to it and finally you initiate behaviour. The KAP model acknowledges that this is a dynamic process, e.g. individuals may engage in practice without necessarily having a fully (in)formed attitude, and therefore full knowledge.(Valente, Paredes and Poppe, 1998).




Figure 1.1: KAP-Model

The KAP variables knowledge, attitude and practice are useful because they facilitate insights about the process of behavioural change in the four dimensions of political culture in which Evo Morales practices his identity politics. More specifically, the KAP-model may be used to analyse and assist understanding of the students’ political culture. By observing the construction of the political culture of students and how the model may be related to identity politics, it is possible to examine the role of identity politics within the KAP-model (as political culture). Scholarly research acknowledges the KAP structure provides an ideal model with which to explore the proposition that if an intervention changes behaviour, then knowledge and attitude will also have already changed. (Valente, Paredes and Poppe, 1998).

There are a number of approaches that may be adopted to measure knowledge, attitude and practice. In the context of this study for example, knowledge may be interpreted as being familiar with the current political system and being aware of and being able to exercise informed choice about support for important political actors. Attitude can be measured in the form of a scale and by this it is possible to assess people’s subjective opinions and as has already been noted, the KAP-model provides a basis for locating and measuring practice.

Table 1.1 summarizes the six possible orders of knowledge, attitude and practice. The first is the classic *cognitive* model (1), it was first used over 50 years ago but continues to be commonly employed by social scientists: individuals learn about a practice, then develop an attitude towards it and then all engage in the practice. Applied to research about Bolivian students, this may mean that they first gain knowledge about the identity politics of Evo Morales then, based on their knowledge they take position for or against the president and finally they act in a particular way. The second model is the *affinity model* (2), practice is again the ultimate construct but here attitude exists before knowledge. Attitude is interpreted as the drive to learn more and to adopt into practice. If this model is applied to research about Bolivian students, their attitude would be regarded as having been already formed before they got substantive information about the government but only after having acquired the latter knowledge would they would they initiate action. The *rational model* (3) is based on the hypothesis that if individuals learn enough about certain topics, they will engage in practice regardless of their attitude or feelings. Again, in the case of the Bolivian students this might indicate that students do not allow their own feelings towards the identity politics influence their political action. For example, students might vote in approval of the New Constitution but may still have negative feelings about Evo Morales as president of Bolivia. The fourth model is called ‘*grudging acceptance*’ (4) because it infers that individuals first engage in practice and then acquire knowledge and attitude. This may most easily illustrated when behaviour is imposed on individuals, e.g. students being forced engage in practice, to vote in an election, the experience generating knowledge and attitude.

In the last two models knowledge is the ultimate outcome. The *dissonance* model (5) suggests that when individuals start acting in a certain way (practice), they form an attitude about their behaviour and learn experientially. This model is referred to as dissonant because individuals engage in certain behaviour about which they may have little prior knowledge. Although this is an ideal-type model, it is easy to imagine how inconsistencies could develop, e.g. the students acting against the national government without fully understanding the ideas the government stands for and the possibly grave consequences of their actions for Bolivia’s political stability. The final model is designated the ‘*emotional model*’ because everything originates from individual attitude, with feelings rather than knowledge promoting action. Whether as a consequence of action in opposition or in support of the government, critics of student political activity often infer support for the emotional model, characterising students actions as the outcome of youthful immaturity.

Table 1.1: Six Possible Behaviour Change Sequences		
<i>Label</i>	<i>Model</i>	<i>Description</i>
1. Learning	K-A-P	Cognitive progression through stages
2. Affinity	A-K-P	Liking leads to knowledge gain and then initiation of practice
3. Rational	K-P-A	Knowledge of benefits leads to action regardless of attitude
4. Grudging Acceptance	P-K-A	Practice is initiated, learning comes via experience and attitudes shift later
5. Dissonance	P-A-K	Practice leads to positive attitude with knowledge gained through experience
6. Emotional	A-P-K	Liking the behaviour leads to adoption of knowledge as secondary consideration.

Source: Valente, Paredes and Poppe, 1998

The six models shown in table 1.1 therefore have relevance in analysing and exemplifying the relationship between political culture and identity politics. That said, conforming to the principles of the original KAP-model, it might be considered that students’ pattern of behavioural change would involve Bolivian students learning about the identity politics of the government; developing a particular attitude before acting collectively. Bearing this in mind I determined which model displayed elements that were most appropriate to use with reference to the research conducted about the university students at La Paz and El Alto.

1.5 Socio-economical Background

Instead of applying the unmodified, classical learning model (KAP) to the analysis of the students’ political culture, it is necessary to consider the possibility that students had already formed a particular attitude towards the current government before they searched for information or initiated action. The latter could have arisen or been influenced by student demographic characteristics and their socio-economical background, e.g. general patterns of familial relationships suggest that dependent students will develop similar opinions to those of their parents. If this assumption is correct then if parents were totally opposed to the identity politics of Evo Morales then it would follow that students would be similarly inclined.

There are a couple of obvious characteristics that are shared the research target group: all are university students studying in La Paz and El Alto. However, as became apparent during a workshop on ‘intersectionality’ although a researcher tries to look for similarities in the target group, it is also of crucially important to be aware of heterogeneity of the target group. It is essential to take account of those categories which are constructed by culture and society and to recognize that they never act independently from each other (Eerdewijk and Guadeloupe, lecture notes 23 October 2008). Taking this into account and with the intention of better understanding students position in Bolivian society, three identity markers have been used in analysing findings of the student target group, specifically the respondent’s class, ethnicity and gender. There will be special focus on the categories of class, ethnicity and gender to better understand how students are positioned in the Bolivian society and which influence these identity markers have on their political culture.


In examining differences within the political culture of the target group and to better understand the factors influencing the way in which identity politics influence political

culture, students’ socio-economic circumstances may influence them to act in a restricted way before becoming fully informed about the government. As such, identity markers may introduce a bias, conspiring against the classical learning model of behaviour change for political action in Bolivia. If this hypothesis is correct, it means that knowledge, attitude and practice interact with one another in a way that differs from what may be inferred from the established KAP-model.

The three indicators for identity (class, ethnicity and gender) have been used to analyse the influence of a student’s socio-economical background on his/her political culture and how their socio-economical circumstances can also be viewed as acting like a filter zone between identity politics and the political culture.

1.6 Operationalisation

In addition to defining the key concepts that inform research and analysis of the data, it is also possible to represent the relationship between them diagrammatically (Figure 1.2). The schema illustrates how the KAP-model has been integrated in the analytical framework and positions other variables that may influence or modify the main focus. The diagram also draws attention to the relative locations of identity politics and the political culture.



The drafting of the principal research question and supplementary questions has been informed by on this analytical schema. The primary research question is:

How does identity politics influence the political culture of students in La Paz and El Alto (Bolivia)?

The subsequent three supplementary questions are necessary to establish an answer on the primary research question:

1. What does the political culture of students in La Paz and El Alto look like in terms of knowledge, attitude and practice?
2. What are the defining aspects of identity politics in Bolivia?
3. How are identity markers (class, ethnicity and gender) reflected in the knowledge, attitude and practice of the general political culture of students in La Paz and El Alto?
4. How are identity markers (class, gender and ethnicity) reflected in the knowledge, attitude and practice of the identity political culture of students in La Paz and El Alto?

The first supplementary question, involving the formation of political culture, directly addresses the central issue and *political culture* has been operationalised in terms of student knowledge, attitude and practice toward politics. These three variables are further operationalised into six more detailed variables. The latter variables consist of: (a) satisfaction with democracy in Bolivia, (b) confidence in political institutions, (c) knowledge and interests in politics, (d) political participation, (e) identification with national identity and other citizens, and (f) satisfaction with governmental output. The questionnaire has been used as the principle tool with which to measure these variables and thereby to determine the formation of the political culture.

Answering the second supplementary question, about student opinions about identity politics demands further information about three key topics. To get a clear view about the opinions about identity politics in Bolivia it is also necessary to draw attention to the origin and increasing appeal of identity politics; the way identity politics are reflected in the governments policies and in the Bolivian society (representation), and the effects of policy enactment and implementation (outcomes).

In order to triangulate data gathered from responses to the questionnaire, participant observation and in-depth interviews were been conducted. The latter were conducted with students from three different universities; a political scientist and a political (see appendix 4). Participant observation and literature study of the new Constitution and the book written by a Bolivian journalist.

The third and fourth supplementary-question is based on the hypothesis that the socio-economical background of students operates like a filter between identity politics and the political culture, with the social class background of students influencing student knowledge, attitude and practice in relation to identity politics. To generate an meaningful response to the third supplementary question, I looked at the influence of demographic characteristics on the political culture. The demographic characteristics of students are linked with identity markers (class, ethnicity and gender) that assist location of the respondent's position in Bolivian society.



Methodology

During the field research in La Paz and El Alto (Bolivia) it was planned to explore the importance of identity politics in the political culture of students from three universities. This chapter will explain the selection of the target group and research location; the research methods and the way these methods contribute to the measurement of the three key variables: knowledge, attitude and practice. This chapter also clarifies the research methods used to answer the primary research question and the supplementary questions. The main research methods that were used in this research are questionnaires, a focus group and a number of in-depth interviews. Participant observation and unstructured interviews have been conducted to supplement other data.

2.1 Selection of research location and research population

2.1.1 *La Paz and El Alto*

Since the Bolivian population elected Evo Morales as first indigenous president of the country, the country has attracted the attention of the global media. Media reportage and comment was not always positive, particularly during the period August – October 2008. The latter was influenced by the exercise of identity politics by the president and the associated incidence of violent confrontations between Morales’ supporters and the political opposition. The inception of this research was partly influenced by recent developments, involving increased political polarization in the country and also as a consequence of personal experiences during a visit to Bolivia. Although Bolivia provided an appropriate location in which to conduct research, this topic may also be conducted elsewhere in Latin America. For example, in Venezuela political polarization arising from the socialist policies of Hugo Chavez persists, and in his mission to establish the ‘New Socialism of the 21st century’, the president of Ecuador is emulating Morales. (Peirs 2004; Haenen 2007).

The research took place in the two most important cities of Bolivia’s Western highlands, La Paz and El Alto. Collectively, the total population of La Paz and El Alto is approximately 1,7 million. El Alto was previously a shantytown suburb of La Paz, and consisted of closely-packed barrios but by 1986 suburban expansion led to the creation of the city of El Alto, as a part of the La Paz urban region. La Paz developed in a natural canyon carved out by the Choqueyapu River but geographically and socially the city is fractured by sharp class divisions. The population of La Paz consists of a small urban elite, a newly emergent middle class and an expanding poverty-stricken lower class (Urbanization Geography Page). Although administratively separate, La Paz and El Alto are otherwise one conurbation, and the vast majority of *Alteños* either seek employment or work in central La Paz.⁵ Prior contact with the three universities and students also facilitated selection of La Paz and El Alto as appropriate locations in which to conduct research in the field.

The political topography of La Paz and El Alto presents some inherent difficulties in conducting field research because they are situated in Bolivia’s Western highlands, a region that has always supported Evo Morales, and he is more popular in these cities than elsewhere, e.g. Santa Cruz or Tarija. Had field research been carried out in the Eastern lowlands, the results would almost certainly have been very different, partly as a consequence of socio-economic divisions but also because of the configuration of dominant

⁵ inhabitants of El Alto

images generated by the media, educational institutions and at street level. This research is a comparative research among students of different social classes within the same geographical region and its findings are not more generally applicable to all the Bolivian students.

2.1.2 *Students as target group of the research*

This research involves gathering data from both individual and groups of university students, studying at three universities in La Paz and El Alto. The decision to narrow focus on students, as opposed to a broader sample of young adults, was informed by the assumption that students in general are most likely to think actively about politics (e.g. student activism during the 1960s and 1970s – Vietnam anti-war protests; ‘second wave’ feminism and numerous civil rights movements, notably the NAACP in the USA). Although many qualifications have to be made, in general the political culture of students is probably more vital than the political culture of other young adults who are not students. Because they do not conform to the profile of my general target group, older (‘mature’) adult students have been omitted from the research.

In order to get a clear view on the role of identity politics within different political cultures, considerable care was exercised in selecting a sample composed of students from different socio-economic backgrounds. The technique that most appropriate for the purpose was *stratified sampling* because it enables researchers to capture a reasonable representative sample of the concerned population groups (Desai and Potter 2006,169). In this project, categories are identified by class and ethnicity but gender was not taken into account because at an early stage in the planning process, there was little guarantee that there would be enough women students for research purposes

The three universities were institutionally distinctive: the public university of El Alto (Universidad Popular de El Alto) was regarded as an ‘indigenous’ university, attended by students of whom the majority were local, predominantly ‘indigenous’ residents. The public university of La Paz (Universidad Mayor de San Andres) was also populated by students from the comparatively wealthy central area of El Alto city and the wealthier residential neighbourhoods of La Paz. Most of these students were middle class, with a reputation for being politically aware and disposition for engaging in political activism. The third university was the private university in La Paz (Universidad Privada Boliviana) whose study fees, averaging \$15.000 for a four-year study programme, could only be afforded by students from comparatively wealthy, upper class Bolivian families – a perspective reinforced by images on the university’s website.⁶

2.1.3 *The sampling plan*

The aforementioned universities each tended to recruit students from different representative strata in the Bolivian society from which a *random sample* was used to select the respondents on a valid basis. This means that each university’s research target group was composed of respondents who were broadly representative of a particular stratum but random selection was employed to select individuals willing to participate in the survey. Interviews were carried out at the different faculties during the break while students had sufficient time in which to record a written response to the questionnaire..

During the first week of research a pilot survey was conducted, involving 20 respondents enrolled at the public university of La Paz (Universidad Mayor de San Andres). The exercise turned out to be very time-consuming, and it was clear that there would be insufficient in which to conduct research in classrooms, a strategy that had originally featured

⁶ Homepage Universidad Privada Boliviana: http://www.upb.edu/admisiones/matri_cole_costos.html

in the research proposal. In each of the three selected universities I managed to gather 100 completed questionnaires, which makes it easier to make comparisons between each of the three groups.

2.2 Mixed Research Methods

Both quantitative (survey/questionnaire) and qualitative (focus group/interviews) research methods were used during the field work period in Bolivia. The mix of questionnaires and interviews were used to contribute to the validity and reliability of this data. The combination of quantitative and qualitative research methods facilitated the triangulation of this research, linking both methods to guarantee the validity and reliability of the findings. In some research these different methods are used parallel to each other, while this research combined quantitative and qualitative methods in a sequential way (Flick, 2007, 95).

Because of my earlier visits to Bolivia it was unnecessary to start with a qualitative explorative research to develop the hypotheses. Thus, during the first period of the research (January – March 2009) I was able to start immediately on the quantitative research, using the questionnaire. In the final month of research (half March – half April 2009) I addressed the qualitative research which proved to be very helpful for interpreting and clarifying results derived from statistical analysis. Use was made of the standardized surveys to design a guide for the in-depth interviews. The latter were intended to give greater insight into the different social processes that have taken place since Evo Morales’ election as president. According to Barton and Lazarsfeld (in Flick, 2009:95), qualitative research is recognised as a good means of drawing attention to possible connections, reasons, effects and dynamics of social processes.

The questionnaire (see appendix 4) consisted of 21 closed questions: the majority of which concerned knowledge, attitude and practice of students toward politics questions about the demographic characteristics of students formed a smaller part of the survey. This structured questionnaire was the principal method used to gather information recorded in writing by the respondents themselves in about 25 minutes. In addition to being a fairly brief process, care had to be taken in framing questions that were unambiguous (Desai and Potter 2006,166). Before conducting the pilot survey, the questions recorded in a preliminary draft were checked with students and revised before being distributed at the public university of La Paz (UMSA). The decision to conduct the pilot survey at UMSA was because local contacts ensured the distribution would be easier and quicker to achieve than it would have been at either of the other two universities.

Based on this information from the questionnaire, a sub-sample was used to reselect respondents from the questionnaire for more detailed research in a focus group discussion. *Stratified sampling* was used to select this group of people. The criteria for inclusion in the sub-sample was based on respondents’ participation in political organizations (therefore very interested in politics) balanced by other students who were not at all interested in politics. Focus groups are an excellent means for exploring group behaviour, interaction and norms. This group discussion was expected to contribute insights about the role of identity politics within the political culture and to understand the influence of the socio-economical background on the political culture. (Desai and Potter 2006:154)

During the focus group sessions participatory techniques were used to provide guidance and facilitate acquisition of relevant information. Thus, sorting was employed to check how respondents grouped certain concepts, items or behaviour, and in this case, a valuable means of analysing the characteristics of identity politics. Respondents were requested to compile a list of all the concepts related to identity politics, and it was

subsequently possible to sort the concepts into different categories, e.g. ‘positive ideas’; ‘negative ideas’; ‘cause of identity politics’, and ‘effects of identity politics’. The respondents themselves were invited to engage in ‘free sorting’ grouping responses, with no limit to the number, size or significance of each groups. (Harloff 2008). To answer the central research question it was very productive to use sorting as a means of understanding the focus group feelings about politics. It had originally been planned to conduct a series of group discussions with three groups of students: one group with lower-class students, another with middle class students and a third group composed students representing the wealthy elite. Unfortunately, due to lack of time in which to conduct the projected group work, it was only possible to conduct a single three-hour long session, involving five students from the Public University of La Paz (UMSA). For the purposes of responding to the principal research question, one focus group session provides some information, though the scale of the response is obviously and regrettably limited.

In addition to members of the focus group, I also reselected from the completed questionnaires, respondents of the different universities for individual, in-depth interviews. These in-depth interviews were initiated to gain insights about student perspectives and opinions. The interviews were conducted in a semi-structured way because this seemed to be the most useful with regard to the research task and the restricted amount of time available for the activity. Adhering to a pre-determined list of topics for the in-depth interviews facilitated comparison between individual interviewees but care was taken to ensure enough room remained for interviewees to relate their own story. In all, eight semi-structured in-depth interviews were conducted; six with students and two with the experts: a political philosopher and a political scientist. All these interviews took place at a time and place chosen by the interviewee because it was considered important to ensure an interviewee was comfortable in the environment in which interview took place. The sites where the in-depth interviews took place were invariably neutral public spaces: including a university coffee bar and a public park.

The final element of qualitative research method involving participant observation was used to analyse whether the results from the questionnaire, focus group and in-depth interviews reflected political reality. Participant observation is a qualitative research method which is grounded in anthropology, and is an open-ended observation technique that is used to direct attention outside the field of expected outcomes (Desai and Potter 2006). Utilizing participant observation granted insights about political behaviour of students, and the information derived from observations was principally used to check or test the data gathered by the questionnaire and focus groups, rather than as an additional authoritative source. The observations were recorded in diary form, noting relevant developments or issues that that were witnessed, experienced or overheard during visits to the universities or outside educational contexts, interacting with friends and other Bolivians I encountered. Having previously lived for a year in Bolivia as an exchange student, I had little problem with linguistic communication, interpreting social interaction and significance of symbols. It was therefore comparatively easy to participate in the lives of students and draw on this ethnographic method to clarify and better understand what was happening in the lives of students in La Paz. In compiling these observations, considerable effort was devoted to establishing an immediate, experiential understanding of student political behaviour. Participant observation was a unique, unstructured learning opportunity to appreciate very directly the polarization of the Bolivian society. During the unstructured conversations with friends and acquaintances (also students) it was possible to take account of the influences and imperatives that stir and shape political culture, including factors that determine why particular political ideas cause students to act or react.

2.3 Analysis of the collected data

Raw data gathered from qualitative and quantitative research both required encoding for the purpose of analysis. The qualitative data, derived from observations, the focus group and in-depth interviews was labelled according to the key variables: knowledge (about identity politics), attitude (toward identity politics), practice, identity politics and background information. Quantitative data was analysed by using the statistical programme SPSS. All the data collected through the questionnaire was been entered in SPSS in order to generate descriptive statistics and regression analysis. The variables: knowledge, attitude and practice were aggregated into one index entitled '*political culture index*'. To measure the role of identity politics within the political culture, it was necessary to merge the variables: knowledge about identity politics, attitude towards identity politics and practice towards identity politics.

The qualitative data was subjected to *labelling* and *discourse analysis*. Labelling was principally used to analyse the qualitative data of in-depth interviews and focus groups; discourse analysis was employed to probe the role of culture and identity in the lives of the respondents. Discourse analysis is a means of evaluating qualitative material and is usually applied to texts and documents, which are understood by practitioners to constitute social practices.

In applying discourse analysis to raw data gathered from the focus group, a written transcript of the focus group session in its entirety was deconstructed, using four key perspectives: (i) a critical position towards taken-for-granted knowledge, (ii) the recognition that our understandings of the world are historically and culturally specific and relative, (iii) the conviction that knowledge is socially constructed and (iv) a commitment to exploring the ways that knowledge is linked to actions and practices (Mikkelsen 2007).

By using discourse analysis it was intended to identify factors influencing political behaviour and particular attention was devoted to the role of identity when processing the transcribed in-depth discussion. Although one discourse may appear dominant during the analytical process, a plurality (i.e. more than one discourse) were introduced by participants. Because of the diverse personal backgrounds of the focus group participants, they generated and deployed a range of elements from different discourses but it was possible to synthesise elements of different discourses into a unitary narrative. Thus, even when participants may have been exercised by a range of motives, all may be taken to be directed toward a common end.

3

Context and Background

To fully appreciate the context in which the political culture of adolescents in Bolivia is formed, attention needs to be paid to the political background of Bolivia during the period that has elapsed since Evo Morales election. However, to better understand the political crisis Bolivia is going through, it is also necessary to pay due attention to the country’s regional, social and ethnic divisions.

3.1 Bolivia: a divided country

Bolivia is almost universally acknowledged to be one of the poorest countries of Latin America. For example, the United States’ Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) World Fact Book (2006) acknowledges that approximately 60% of the Bolivian population has a standard of living below the poverty line⁷. Although poverty is widespread, it is not universal and nor are the poor evenly distributed geographically around the country according to the poverty mapping exercise carried out by Arias and Robles (2007). Their study concluded that the overwhelming majority of poor Bolivians lived in rural areas. However, they also noted considerable differences in the nature and incidence of impoverished communities in major conurbations. Monetary poverty is concentrated in the valleys and Bolivia’s Western Highlands: namely Beni, Chuquisaca, Potosí, La Paz and Oruro. Beni, the northern, subtropical department and La Paz manifest the highest levels of poverty, with more than half the population subsisting below the poverty line.

The pattern of Bolivia’s impoverishment is also characterised by sharp disparities in patterns of expenditure and consumption. In some departments, including Beni, Pando and Tarija economic inequalities have been relieved to some extent by the pattern of settlement and economic benefits associated with agriculture, gas and oil resources, and their location, adjacent to Bolivia’s borders with Argentina and Brazil. Moreover, there is comparatively low proportion of indigenous (and therefore low income) people resident in these departments than elsewhere in Bolivia (Arias and Robles, 2007). There is a marked correspondence between areas of pronounced poverty and the distribution of indigenous populations, the majority of whom live in the poorest departments, located in the Bolivian highlands (La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Chuquisaca).

The gulf that separates rich and poor is only one of the many divisions that fracture Bolivia, and with good cause that journalists often refer to it as “the divided country” (iWitness Video Report, 9 October 2008). The country is fractured along regional, social and ethnic lines and the increasingly serious divisions contribute to the growing polarisation of Bolivian society, developments to which the Argentine political scientist Andrés Serbin has drawn recently attention (Marquez, 2008). The regional divisions are reflected in the growth of secessionism and formation of autonomy movements in the wealthier lowland provinces of eastern Bolivia. The latter, include the departments of Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz and Tarija, collectively dubbed *La Media Luna* (geographically they form a crescent, see map in Appendix 1) and associated political elites express distaste and hostility about departments with a substantially indigenous population. The long established misdistribution of wealth

⁷ National estimates of the percentage of the population falling below the poverty line are based on surveys of sub-groups, with the results weighted by the number of people in each group. Definitions of poverty vary considerably among nations. For example, rich nations generally employ more generous standards of poverty than poor nations. (World Fact Book, 2006)

and assets has become more acute and a social chasm divides a comparatively small wealthy minority and a huge dispossessed majority of the population. Finally, Bolivian society is ethnically divided between the country’s indigenous majority (according to the World Fact Book, 55% of the population has an indigenous ethnicity) and an elite composed of inhabitants of European or mixed race origin.

Andrew Crosson’s Blogresearch (Portrait Bolivia Blog, comment posted June 25, 2008) about Bolivia has noted that different forms of polarization are manifested in the press and by educational institutions, including various universities. Crosson maintains that schools and universities were divided along strict social and economic lines and argued that the form and content of the educational process equated to ideological indoctrination, perpetuating and thereby contributing to the intensification of economic and political attitudes. In his examination of the Bolivian media, Crosson traced similar divisions between pro-government public service broadcasting channels and commercial media corporations supporting the anti-government opposition. He points out that the general absence of readily accessible objective information by the media obstructed development of social and political consensus. Without the media broadcasting full and reliable information, reasoned public debate fails to develop. Instead, simplistic declarations of political position and complex issues are reduced too black-&-white, us-versus-them conflicts. Crosson concludes that what he regards as a psychological phenomenon effectively contributes to polarisation.⁸

The Bolivian political philosopher Pablo Perez Ayala, who was interviewed during the course of research, argued that the polarisation being experienced in Bolivian society is essentially theoretical than physical or military. He explained this theoretical polarisation as something almost literally occurring in people’s heads rather than a more general phenomenon likely to provoke a civil war. He expressed some qualification, ‘Excepciones son unos grupos radicales en el oriente de Bolivia como Juvenil Cruzeñista y aquí los radicales como ‘El Mallku’ de Achacachi en el occidente. Pero por la mayoría es un rechazo emocional nomás.’⁹ In comparison with what had occurred in post-apartheid South Africa and the Balkans after 2001, the racism and polarisation since the Bolivian revolution of 1952 had not been as intense as it could have been and that during there had been a measure of integration of different ‘races’ into one society.

Perez Ayala presented an impressive and well-argued exposition about racism and polarisation in Bolivia but his understanding needed to be further qualified in the light of recent racist incidents in Bolivia.

3.2 Evo Morales’ Reforms: a political crisis

In 2005 Bolivia’s conservative elites were convinced that Morales would be defeated and were understandably disappointed when he was elected president with 51% of voters. However, for a couple of months Morales’ opponents acquiesced to the outcome of his election and gave the appearance of accepting the outcome.

It was not long before conservative reaction exposed what may always have been a political mirage. Since a key feature of Morales’ programme committed him to constitutional reform and the creation of greater social equity, a Constituent Assembly was convened to draft new national constitution. The event was also viewed by conservatives as an opportunity to demonstrate their profound opposition to the new government’s policies. In

⁸ <http://portraitbolivia.blogspot.com>: retrieved on 3 November 2008

⁹ Translation: ‘Exceptions are some radical groups in East of Bolivia like Juvenil Cruzeñista and here the radical people like ‘El Mallku’ from Achacachi in the West. But for the majority it is just an emotional rejection.’

the last week of November 2007, the building in which where the assembly convened was physically attacked by a right-wing mob and three people died as a consequence of the violent disorder that characterised the protest.

Thereafter, conservative proxies of prefects of Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz and Tarija conducted a referendum about constitutional devolution of power that would grant autonomy and financial provision for the departments of *La Media Luna*. The referendum was controlled by civic committees composed of people supporting greater autonomy for the departments of *La Media Luna*. Even though the referendum was declared to be illegal by the National Electoral Court, the would-be secessionists were well rewarded in Santa Cruz, where almost 80% of the inhabitants voted in favour of greater departmental autonomy. As a consequence, Ruben Costa, prefect of Santa Cruz, supported by the opposition and social elites successfully pressed for a national referendum in 2008 to test support for Evo Morales and his administration. Yet again conservatives were disappointed by the outcome because Morales won with more than 67% of the votes.

The outcome of the regional referendum and Evo Morales’s victory in the national referendum has exacerbated the polarization between elites and indigenous people; nationalists and separatists; pro- and anti-Morales factions. In September 2008 the conservatives took to the streets again: streets and public spaces were barricaded; mobs occupied government buildings; indigenous people were assaulted and in Pando about thirty *campesinos* were brutally killed. The civil disruption and conservative elites’ ill-concealed support for armed right-wing paramilitary groups had created great instability and their critics argue that the conservatives wish to destroy Bolivian democracy (Ojalá, Bolivia Ahora Blog, comment posted on September 25, 2008). This was hardly unexpected, given the politically biased nature of the Bolivian media reportage but international monitors representing Union of South American Nations (UNASUR) and the European Union (EU) were also very critical in their conclusions about acts of violence that occurred during August and September 2008.

The Emergency Summit of UNASUR, convened in Santiago de Chile during September 2008 went further and the eight presidential delegates issued a communiqué declaring unanimous support for (their fellow delegate) Morales’ government, unequivocally condemning the prefect and demanding an independent investigation into acts of political terrorism in Pando. UNASUR also called on all political and social actors to halt the violent actions, intimidation and attacks on democratic structures and the judicial institutions. The declaration by UNASUR caused the prefects of *La Media Luna* to open a dialogue with the government and on the 20th of October 2008 the Bolivian Congress ratified legislation that would facilitate the holding of a referendum on the new constitution.

The EU observers were of the opinion that the civil disorder and killings in Bolivia amounted to an attempted coup d’etat, and condemned the anti-democratic activities of the conservatives and paramilitary thugs. The European Union declared that it would not interfere in Bolivia’s domestic politics but asserted their support for the democratic process and announced that the EU would be prepared to defend Human Rights in the country (Ojalá, Bolivia Ahora Blog, comment posted on September 28, 2008).




Political Culture: Growing Up With The Revolution


It is unwise to lay claim total knowledge and perfect insight about Latin American society and political culture. However, this chapter presents a comprehensible and reasonably comprehensive summary about the political culture of Bolivian students living in La Paz or El Alto derived from the 300 responses to the survey questionnaire; in-depth interviews and participant observation.

4.1 Knowledge About Bolivian Politics

Since there is a reciprocal connection between motivation and knowledge, it was important to get data about students own perception of the extent to which they felt themselves to be interested in Bolivian politics. They were questioned about their sources of information about political matters, including how many times a week they looked for political news in: newspapers, radio, television or the internet. Their knowledge about political parties, the new constitution and local municipal politics was also probed. All the data was collated and incorporated in a knowledge index. (Figure 4.1)



The majority of students classed themselves as being somewhat interested in politics but 27.3% declared that they were ‘very interested’, and therefore comparatively more highly motivated to be knowledgeable about political developments. The most important and most frequently used source of information in the opinion of two-thirds of all students was daily television news bulletins. A minority of students regarded daily newspapers, radio, and internet as an important source of information. (Figure 4.2)



Given the pivotal importance of the referendum on the New Constitution, the document was an appropriate item with which to test respondents' political knowledge. In response to a question about whether they had read about the document before casting their votes on 25th of January 2009, 69.3% stated that they had substantial knowledge about the provisions of the new Constitution. However, their familiarity with the text was almost certainly exaggerated and from participant observation and the unstructured interviews revealed that most of the students had read parts of the New Constitution but not the entire document.

Students knowledge about the party political affiliations of members of the Senate, the upper house in Bolivia's bi-cameral government was rather sketchy. Many respondents engaged in speculation about the number and names but only 18.7% correctly identified the four political parties represented in the Senate: MAS¹⁰, Podemos¹¹, UN¹², and MNR.¹³

4.1.1 Class

Within all three social classes there were no significant differences in the levels of political interest but there were marked differences in the use of media. Although television was the most frequently used news medium for all students; on average they watched one news bulletin a day. However, on a daily basis students enrolled at the more elite universities did not watch television news as frequently as those from the lower social class. Of the latter: 36% of them watched television news bulletins several times a day; 41% once a day and 17% at various times during a week.

To get other information on their level and nature of knowledge, respondents were asked to answer a handful of factual questions, including: What is the name of the mayor of La Paz and the mayor El Alto?.

¹⁰ Movimiento al Socialismo.

¹¹ Poder Democrático y Social.

¹² Unión Nacional.

¹³ Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario.

The mayor of La Paz, Juan del Granado, was well-known to most students but Fanor Nava (mayor of El Alto) on the other hand, was only known by half of them. Rather unsurprisingly, the latter he was best known by students of the lower social class (86%) because most of them lived in El Alto, the former shantytown of La Paz.

Regarding the question about the political parties in the Senate, I already indicated that most of the students were speculative in answering this question. For this reason, the only important data here is from the students who knew the four political parties. It is remarkable that interest in politics seems not always to correspond with real knowledge. Although 27% of the low class students, 26% of the middle class, and 29% of the high class students indicated to be very interested in politics only 16% of the low class, 27% of the middle class and 13% of the high class students knew the members of the Senate.

4.1.2 Ethnicity

It was unambiguously clear that students from indigenous ethnic communities were the most interested in politics. One third of the Aymará students were very interested in politics, compared with 26.8% of the white students and 24% of the mestizos. Statistical tests on the correlation between the variables *ethnicity* and *interest in politics* confirmed a link between student identification with Aymará ethnic affiliation and a marked degree of political interest.¹⁴ This relationship is a relatively low-average connection since the statistical analysis indicates a Phi of 0.249¹⁵ (see Appendix 1.1).

There was also a significant association between ethnicity and the frequency with which respondents watched television news bulletins, read newspapers, or listened to radio news items. It is remarkable that only 17.9% from the students who identified themselves with the Aymará ethnicity regarded newspapers an important source of information, whereas these percents for white and mestizo students were respectively 42.9% and 32.7%. Even though all three groups of students of read newspapers several times a week, the frequency of newspaper reading by ethnic Quechua students' newspaper ranged between various times a week and almost never, contrasting with a much more restricted spread amongst the white students. The frequency and comparable range within the group of white students was respectively higher and more uniform than amongst ethnic and mestizo groups.


The white students listened on average several times a week to news on the radio but Aymará and mestizo students listened to radio news bulletins every day. Although the mean was the same, there was a significant difference between these two group: one third of the Aymará students listened several times a day to the radio compared with 22% of the mestizo students.

4.1.3 Gender

The influence of gender, the third identity marker, revealed that generally there were few noticeable differences between men and women's political knowledge but men considered themselves to be more interested in politics than women. This difference was also reflected in terms of the priority allocated to sources primarily used to gather the daily news. Male students generally made more use of television, newspaper, radio and internet (Figure 4.3)

¹⁴ Pearson Chi-Square Test is a statistical method used to analyse data correlation.

¹⁵ Phi and Cramer's V are statistical methods to analyse the strength of data correlation.




Television bulletins, as the most preferred source of news, were watched several times a day by equal numbers of men and women (both 32%). Other sources of news, including the newspapers, radio and internet were used more frequently on a daily basis by men than by women.

4.2 Attitude Towards Bolivian Politics

In addition to examining attitude to democracy governmental policies, identification with fellow citizens and Bolivian national identity were probed. This was measured by asking students to indicate the level of trust they had for fellow citizens and Bolivian political institutions.

In charting students political knowledge, the variables concerning attitude were amalgamated into a common 'attitude index', and presented in the form of a bar diagram. (Figure 4.4). The majority of respondents demonstrate a generally neutral or positive attitude towards the Bolivian politics and half of the students believe that democracy is practised in Bolivia. However, the majority of respondents (67.6%) consider that power is in the hands of a small unrepresentative elite and that politicians tend to tell lies when seeking to get themselves elected.



4.2.1 Class

During in-depth interviews with students of different social classes, their opinions were sought about the policies of the Morales government. The approval of the new constitution was for students of the low class the most important change since Morales’ election. Cipriano stated, ‘Con la Nueva Constitución tenemos por fin nuestra realidad’¹⁶. He and other students with lower social class backgrounds considered that the document was drafted by Bolivians for Bolivians; a significant difference from earlier Bolivian constitutions that were modelled on those of other countries..

The sections of the new constitution that referred to ‘Bono Dignidad’ and the ‘Bono Juancito Pinto’ were regarded positively by middle class students as the best undertaking by the government. The ‘Bono Dignidad’ was a monthly payment for the elderly, people over 60 years old. Those with a pension were granted a monthly additional sum of 100 Bolivianos (10 EUR); those without any pension whatsoever were granted a monthly entitlement of 200 Bolivianos (20 EUR). The ‘Bono Juancito Pinto’ was a monthly payment of 200 Bolivianos to children of state primary schools. One of the wealthier students was highly impressed by the literacy programme inaugurated by the Morales’ administration:

La alfabetización es algo que ni el gobierno de Estados Unidos ni [los] otros gobiernos que supuestamente ayudaban a Bolivia lo han logrado. Los Cubanos, un país pobre y tercer mundista nos ha ayudado y durante dos años se ha alfabetizado al pueblo Boliviano y se ha logrado. Gran acierto de este gobierno!¹⁷

In addition to these observations, all students (low, middle and high class) agreed that the nationalization of the petrol and Bolivia’s other natural resources represented a very important transformation for the country.


¹⁶ Translation: ‘With the New Constitution, we finally have or own reality. ’

¹⁷ Translation: ‘The alphabetization [programme] is something that the government of the United States nor other governments who were supposed to help Bolivia, could provide. The Cubans, [from] a poor country in the Third World, helped us and within two years they taught literacy to the Bolivian people. This government has made an enormous impact!’

Students’ trust in institutions involved measuring the extent of their confidence in members of the National Congress; political parties; the president and his political party, MAS. A significantly high percentage of wealthy upper class students maintained that they distrusted the president and MAS.(Table 4.1)

Table 4.1: Absence of Trust in Institutions (Class)				
	Class			
	Low Class	Middle Class	High Class	Total
Members of the National Congress	36%	35%	35%	35,3%
Political Parties	48%	44%	44%	45,3%
The President	12%	23%	64%	33%
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)	19%	34%	71%	41,8%

Even though lower class students appeared to have more trust in the political institutions, they had considerably less confidence in their fellow citizens than the middle and upper class students. Elite, upper class students generally expressed a high degree of trust in their fellow citizens, with the major exception of the inhabitants of El Alto. (Figure 4.5)



4.2.2 Ethnicity

Research findings demonstrate an unequivocal correlation between indigenous ethnicity and the level of satisfaction expressed about Morales programme for redistribution of power and the implementation of greater political democracy. Dissatisfaction with elite rule was tested by checking students’ response to the following expressions of opinion: ‘There is no

democracy in Bolivia’; ‘Power is in hands of too few people’; ‘In order to be elected politicians have to be well practised liars’; ‘I trust the results of the referendum of August 2008’, and ‘For the progress of Bolivia it is necessary that Evo Morales limits the voice of the opposition’ (see appendix 4). There was a very marked response from students with indigenous ethnic backgrounds to the first statement: 25% of the Aymará students affirmed their belief in the authenticity of Bolivian democracy compared with 1.8% of white students and 7.3% mestizo students. In spite of their demonstrable faith in Bolivian democracy, 26.2% of Aymará students were also totally convinced that power was monopolised by too few people, and a further third partially concurred, expressing reservations about the nature of elite influence. The latter percentages seem to be somewhat contradictory, given their expressed satisfaction with democracy.

Amongst white and mestizo students, the majority considered that political power was monopolised by too few people: 58.9% of white students and 30.7% of the mestizos did not trust the results of the referendum at all. However, the majority of the Aymará and Quechua students affirmed their belief in the results of the referendum. With $\Phi=0,488$ it is possible to conclude that there was a middle-strong correlation between the variables ethnicity and satisfaction with democracy (see appendix 2.3).

There was a pronounced contrast between the students from ethnic communities and non-ethnic students in the relation to the level of personal trust invested in Evo Morales and MAS party. The statistical mean identifiable from the amalgamation of four variables expressed collectively as ‘trust in institutions’ appeared to be rather low for students who identified themselves as ‘white’ than the rest of the sample; Aymará and mestizo students showed on average a low level of confidence, and the mean for Quechua students was located between ‘no trust’ and ‘low confidence percentage’.¹⁸ The white students expressed virtually no confidence at all in political institutions, producing the lowest possible response of ‘one’ on the confidence-scale. The latter finding may be accounted for as a reflection of a more general lack of confidence amongst Bolivia’s white population about Morales and MAS. (Table 4.2)

Table 4.2: Absence of Trust in Institutions (Ethnicity)					
	Ethnicity				
	White	Mestizo	Aymará	Quechua	Total
Members of the National Congress	44,6%	30,7%	40,5%	10%	35,3%
Political Parties	51,8%	42%	50%	20%	45,3%
The President	69,6%	34%	10,7%	0%	33%
Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS)	73,2%	46,3%	17,9%	0%	41,8%

Trust in and identification with fellow citizens had long been recognised as an important element of a stable political culture. (Almond and Verba 1965) In Bolivia’s situation, a basic level of trust in fellow citizens may be regarded as being particularly important because of its strong association with social cohesion, belief that everyone belongs to the same community. In order to assess their level of their trust in fellow citizens, students were questioned about their feelings about: big businessmen; fellow students; students enrolled with universities and

¹⁸ On the confidence scale from 1 to 5: Aymará students scored on average 2; Quechua students scored on average 1.5.

(geographically) their near neighbours; the inhabitants of La Paz and the inhabitants of El Alto.

Absolute distrust about big businessmen was registered by 26.7% of mestizo students; 53% of the Aymarás; 40% of the Quechuas and 10.7% of the white students. However, at the other end of the scale, 19.6% of white students indicated that they had a high degree of trust in big businessmen. The response of white students was reflected more generally in their feelings of trust for other citizens. Although mestizo, Aymará and white students all have an average of a normal confidence percentage (=3) on the variable ‘trust in citizens’, there was only a positive scattering for white students, of whom half had normal confidence in other citizens and one third has a high level of trust in their fellow political actors. The average white student has normal trust in students of their university, students of other universities, neighbours and inhabitants of La Paz. However, 57.1% had absolutely no confidence in inhabitants of El Alto. These findings tend to lend support to the negative image of El Alto as a dangerous city, plagued by high levels of criminality and anti-social behaviour.

The relatively high levels of trust exhibited by white students contrasted markedly with the views of students from an indigenous background. A majority of the latter distrusted their immediate neighbours; students from their university and other universities; inhabitants of La Paz, and big businessmen, creating an impression that they identified mainly with inhabitants of El Alto.

The final indicator used to test the extent student political attitudes was linked to national identity, and invited their response to the statement ‘I am proud to be a Bolivian’ (Table 4.3).

	Ethnicity				
	White	Mestizo	Aymará	Quechua	Total
Totally agree	66.1%	70.7%	71.4%	40.0%	69.0%
Partially agree	19.6%	10.0%	11.9%	10.0%	12.3%
Partially disagree	8.9%	6.0%	3.6%	.0%	5.7%
Totally disagree	.0%	4.0%	2.4%	.0%	2.7%
No opinion	5.4%	9.3%	10.7%	50.0%	10.3%

tabulated results of responses to the statement show a reasonably high degree of cohesion about national identity that was not borne out by in-depth interviews. The latter indicated that identification with the nation was a difficult and quite complex issue for most of the students, who frequently referred in discussion to fellow Bolivians in terms of *we* and *them*. One respondent blamed public controversy about what the socially divisive new constitution, especially the provisions that granted greater autonomy for the indigenous population. For some interviewees, ethnic autonomy had to be deferred until after further maturation of national identity, exemplified by Esther, who observed: ‘No es malo la autonomía así pero necesitamos madurar más como país para este nivel de autonomía. La madurez no se va a lograr cuando no hay identidad nacional.’¹⁹


¹⁹ Translation: ‘Autonomy is not that bad but we have to mature as a country to reach [i.e. sustain] this level of autonomy. This maturity will not be reached if there is no national identity.’

4.2.3 Gender

On a range of issues, gender identity did not figure significantly as an influence on the attitude of students enrolled at universities in La Paz and El Alto. Nor were there more than very minor gender-related deviations in relation to: satisfaction with democracy, trust in institution or citizens or their identification with the nation or any other variables.


4.3 Practice Towards Bolivian Politics

Practice, the remaining dimension of the KAP-model, relates directly to student involvement in political activism, exemplified by student involvement in organisations, meetings or ‘manifestations’ (e.g. political rallies or parades); voting and signing petitions. In order to establish a general image of political activism by respondents, The Practice Index was compiled, presented in the form of a bar chart. The bar diagram (Figure 4.6) below demonstrates the level of practice for all the students who participated in this research.



4.3.1 Class

Unsurprisingly, social class influences students’ disposition to engage in a range of political activities, from taking part in political demonstrations to casting their votes in national and local elections. Students from the lower social class were especially active in all forms of political activism, including: manifestations, political organisation, political meetings and rallies and gathering or signing petitions. As the bar chart shows, they were almost twice as likely as the combined number of other students to take part in manifestations. (Figure 4.7).



There were various reasons why students were motivated to join political demonstrations and protests or less controversial activities. The following examples are derived from in-depth interviews, and they represent ideal types that serve to illustrate the changing motivation as well as the range of groups and activities with which students from different social classes sought to engage themselves.

Luis, a student from a lower social class background, explained why he felt motivated to take part in political demonstrations and how such activities had become a regular feature of his life. He explained that before enrolling as a university student, he had been a pupil at ‘Colegio Ayacucho’, a college whose students were associated violent street protests against the government of Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada. Luis had acted ‘instinctively’, from the gut feeling that violent, direct action was justified to combat what was wrong with the country, adding ‘Yo era empíricamente revolucionario, yo era un loco.’²⁰ However, after enrolling as a law student at the UPEA (the Public University of El Alto), Luis became acquainted with individuals who introduced him to the theoretical foundations of Marxist revolutionary ideology. Latterly, when Luis took part in political demonstrations as a member of a politically conscious revolutionary intelligentsia, he felt well capable of articulating an ideological justification for his involvement in direct action.

José, an upper class student at the elite university UPB, used to be an active supporter of, ‘Bolivia Unida’ a non-violent political organisation that objected to what it considered to be the unacceptably high level of political violence. Bolivia Unida organised vigils in the Plaza Avaroa to demonstrate that the middle and upper classes wanted an end to violent direct action in Bolivia. Esther, a middle class student at the Public University of La Paz (UMSA), took part in a classically liberal foundation (Fundación Boliviana para la Democracia Multipartidaria (FBPLDM) which sought to promote democratic dialogue via organised debates and seminars that addressed political themes.

²⁰ Translation: ‘I was an empirical revolutionist, I was crazy.’

The essentially conciliatory ethos of Bolivia Unida and FBPLDM was totally at odds with the politically radical and highly confrontational organisations with which students of a lower social class tended to be involved. Instead of the middle class support for open dialogue between different political parties; a collective exploration of political issues and ideas, and the desire to promote national unity and social harmony, the organisations of respondents from the lower class (e.g. Luis) were strongly motivated by established, orthodox Marxist-Leninist ideology.

At a less dramatic and less regular intervals, participation in elections and referenda constitutes an important and more widespread form of active participation in the political process. In testing student engagement in elections, they were asked whether they had cast a vote in the presidential election held in December 2005 and the referendum of August 2008 and if so, how they have voted. During the elections of 2005, where Morales won and became president of the country, 43.1% of all the respondents stated that they had voted for Morales; 29.1% said that they had voted for someone else, and 27.8% of the students did not vote at all. Most of the non-voters were given little choice about their abstention because most had not been able to express their views via the ballot box on account of their age, they had been too young to be able to vote..

In table 4.4 is The pattern of student voting behaviour in the 2005 presidential elections and the 2008 referendum revealed a clear correlation between the variables of class and voting behaviour. Statistically, the correlation was $\Phi=0,624$.

Table 4.4: Voting Behaviour (Class)				
	Class			
	Low Class	Middle Class	High Class	Total
2 times against Morales	4.1%	22.2%	38%	21.5%
1 time against, 1 time not voted	4.1%	3%	28%	11.8%
1 time in favour, 1 time against OR 2 times not voted	18.4%	21.2%	27%	22.2%
1 time in favour, 1 time not voted	12.2%	10.1%	4%	8.8%
2 times in favour of Morales	61.2%	43.4%	3%	35.7%

Students advanced different reasons for voting in favour of the indigenous president. One middle class student from UMSA explained that he voted for Morales because he hoped indigenous people would revive individual as well as communal self-esteem.

No estoy tan interesado en la nacionalización del gas, si no es importante para mi que los indígenas pueden expresarse como indígena. Cuando yo estaba en colegio, era bien difícil para decir que soy Quechua, o por lo menos que tengo sangre indígena. Gracias a Evo se ha vuelto normal para decir: ‘yo soy Quechua!’²¹


Another student from a lower social class, enrolled at UPEA said that because his own family circumstances were akin to those of Morales, he could identify better with the latter as president. The student also felt that Morales would be stubborn and effective in opposing

²¹ Translation: ‘I am not that interested in the nationalisation of gas but it is more important for me that indigenous people can express themselves as indigenous [people]. When I was in high school it was very difficult to say that I am Quechua or that at least I have indigenous blood [i.e. part Quechua]. Thanks to Evo it has become acceptable to declare ‘I am Quechua!’

right-wing political parties and that Morales would be a president that would empower the poor and dispossessed.

4.3.2 Ethnicity

There is a marked ethnic deviation in the pattern of participation of students in organisations, meetings, political demonstrations and petitions. The Chi-square test demonstrated a significant correlation between every form of participation to which reference has already been made. However, pattern was not always consistent, e.g. the relationship between ethnicity as independent factor and participation in manifestations (including political demonstrations) as dependent variable was the only connection with a moderate-strong coherence. The figure below (Figure 4.8) expresses how Aymará students are much more participating in manifestations.



The data revealed that Aymará students were relatively highly predisposed to participate in mass political activism, a feature that may mainly be due to the institutional association of the bulk of the Aymara students, most of whom were enrolled at the Public University of El Alto (UPEA). The UOPEA has earned a reputation for being the most politically active in the department of La Paz and its student representative organization model themselves, generally reflect or sometimes act directly as surrogates of radical political parties.

Javier, a political activist in El Alto, explained how the student organisations came to be political surrogates, citing as an example Urus, the biggest student representative organisation. Javier was a member of Urus and stated that Urus was effectively a political front because at the organisational centre was a cell of the Partido Obrero Revolucionario (POR), the Trotskyist political party. Via Urus, Javier explained, POR had established a presence in most of Bolivia’s public universities, including La Paz, Cochabamba, Santa Cruz and Tarija, where it had regularly taken part in local student political activity and simultaneously engaged in dissemination of POR propaganda.

The latter was exemplified in a minor but significant way by the content of election literature distributed amongst students during their midday lunch break at UPEA. Students were approached and solicited for their support by aspiring members of the Student University Council and given election flyers. The flyer was ostensibly about the election but

the improvised graphics consisted of political polemic, principally an amateurish cartoon strip promoting Trotskyist ideas about permanent revolution.²²

Students like Luis (subsection 4.3.1) and Javier who are both enrolled at UPEA, are not passive observers and commentators, they collectively very active in political organisations (27,8%), political meetings (39,3%) and petitions (35,7%). Students with a mestizo or white background are also political active but the extent and level of participation appeared to be less intense than Aymará students. The political organisations in which mestizo student Esther and white student José participated contrast markedly with the political perspectives of student bodies at UPEA and the latter’s espousal of Marxist-Leninism and Trotskyist ideology. (see subsection 4.3.1)

During the course of interviews conducted with students from an indigenous background who were enrolled at UPEA, it soon became apparent that that their involvement was not simply a matter of being politically seduced by poor quality political cartoons. Of those who actively participated in mass political actions, most appear to have thought long and hard about their commitment. They were all very aware of Bolivia’s history, which has plenty of examples of the serious consequences for activists when conservative governments state mobilised police and military forces against left wing political organizations. Even so, the indigenous students’ motives were idealistic and inspired by a desire for fundamental social change. They declared that it was only possible to develop as a person, as a community and as a country by mobilising fellow students, and by extension the Bolivian population to collectively support common objectives. Organization, they insisted, was necessary to debate, construct and circulate ideas.

In some cases the idealistic motives to become involved in political activism and organization were matched by some students’ personal desire to acquire political understanding and skills that could be used outside the confines of UPEA. For example, during the course of the in-depth interview with Javier explained that his long-term ambition to promote revolutionary ideas amongst the general public required him to be better equipped with practical knowledge and organisational experience.

During the course of a separate interview with another Aymara student named Cipriano, it was made clear by the interviewee that his simultaneous participation in a number of political organisations was informed by the desire to develop leadership skills. Cipriano explained:

Por qué es importante participar en organizaciones? Por entregarme de todo, para saber como funcionan las cosas. Como podemos mejorar las cosas? Yo sé que algún día voy a hacer la política pero primero hay que entregarse de lo que vive entre la gente, para trabajar con gente adecuados. [...] Toda la participación es mi propio proyecto para poder ser un buen líder.²³

Analysing voting activity is no less complex than considering student involvement in mass demonstrations and political organizations. In evaluation data gathered about participation in national and regional elections, a number of factors need to be taken into account. For example, when examining the voting activities of students with an indigenous background, it should be noted that not only are the country’s indigenous communities culturally heterogeneous but also student priorities may not accurately reflect those of their

²² Participant observation: February 2009.

²³ Translation: ‘Why is it important to participate in organizations? To learn about everything, to know how things function. How can we make things better? I know that some day I will practice politics but first one have to learn about the things that live around the people and to work with adequate people. [...] All participation is [fulfilling] my own project in becoming a good leader.’

particular ethnic group. However, it was clear that the general electoral response of students was influenced by what was being offered by Morales’ programme for improving the living standards and status the indigenous population. In responding to questions about their voting habits in the 2005 elections, it is abundantly clear that Aymará and Quechua students had overwhelmingly favoured Morales. Though very few white students voted for him, a substantial percentage of mestizo students said that they had supported Morales supporters. (Table 4.5)

Table 4.5: Voting Behaviour Elections 2005					
	Ethnicity				
	Blanco	Mestizo	Aymará	Quechua	Total
In favour of Morales	14,3%	36.2%	72.6%	60%	43.1%
Against Morales	48.2%	33.6%	7.1%	40%	29.1%
Did not voted	37.5%	30.2%	20.2%	0%	27.8%

The ethnic division between pro- and contra-Morales votes that can be seen in the response to the 2005 election was more or less replicated in the 2008 referendum, though there was a slight downward movement in the votes of white students voting for Morales. (Table 4.6) From both sets of data, it is abundantly clear (with 95% reliability) that there was a strong correlation between ethnicity and the way students voted in the elections of 2005 and the referendum of 2008.

Table 4.6: Voting Behaviour Referendum 2008					
	Ethnicity				
	Blanco	Mestizo	Aymará	Quechua	Total
In favour of Morales	8.9%	36.1%	81.0%	60.0%	44.4%
Against Morales	66.1%	40.1%	3.6%	20.0%	34.0%
Did not voted	25.0%	23.8%	15.5%	20.0%	21.5%

In the referendum of 2008, Bolivians were invited to decide whether they favoured Morales continuation as president. Individual students did not always decide how to vote because of Morales charisma and redistributive policies. For example, Esther, a middle class mestizo student, voted in favour of Morales because she believed that Bolivia needed stability: ‘Más que nada no he votado por él [Morales] porque siento algún afinidad personal o política.’²⁴ In her interview, Esther went on to explain that if Bolivia changed the president every two or three years then it would becomes impossible for the country to develop the stability necessary to carry out important social and economic changes. She concluded that Morales had not been president long enough to implement his promise to initiate his programme, and that she felt it was important to give Morales the chance to complete the full duration of his time as president. Finally, she believed that there was no other appropriate candidate to lead the country.

²⁴ Translation: ‘More than anything I have not voted for him [Morales] because I feel some personal or political affinity with him.’

Of the white students who consistently voted against Morales, the in-depth interview conducted with José, a highly articulate student, generated in swift succession five reasons why he voted against Morales. During the course of an in-depth interview Jose advanced five important reasons why he had personally been inclined to vote against Morales. He did not dwell on Morales’ indigenous background as a factor, instead, he argued his presidency would not create political and social unity in Bolivia, and that his economic policies, especially the nationalization of natural resources, had destroyed an important sector of the free market. Foreign business interests, Jose added, would be deterred from investing vitally important capital enterprises and economic projects in Bolivia because Morales might seize their assets. Turning his attention to devolution of power away from central authority, Jose believed greater regional autonomy was necessary in order to accommodate social and indigenous diversity. Finally, he said that Morales would fail to curb widespread financial corruption and his tenure of the presidency would fail to bring down the enormously high levels of inflation that were making life miserable for the entire population..

4.3.3 Gender

Insufficient evidence was found to establish more than a slight difference between patterns of male and female revealed by data analysis about the influence of gender on the dimensions of political activism linked with the general practice of political culture. Participation in manifestations (protest demonstrations and political rallies); active involvement with political organisations; attendance at political meetings and petitions was more or less the same for both male and female students. In terms of their patterns of voting behaviour, there was a noticeable difference between men and women who twice voted in favour of Morales (i.e. 2005 and 2008). The data revealed that 41,6% of male students who twice voted twice in in his favour but only 29% of female students supported Morales but the reasons for this statistical disparity are not immediately apparent.

5

Identity Politics and Political Culture

Having drawn attention to the way in three indicators, associated with identity: class, ethnicity and gender affected dimensions of political culture, it is now possible to advance an informed answer to the question: How does identity politics influence the political culture of students in La Paz and El Alto? The three indicators continue to feature because of their importance in the relationship between identity politics and political culture.

5.1 The Knowledge Dimension Influenced By Identity Politics

To ascertain how the identity politics are influenced by the prevailing political culture, use was again made of the same three indicators that figured in analysing data about the political culture of students. They had previously been incorporated in the Knowledge Index was formed by amalgamating the variables representing: political interest; frequency of utilisation of a range of sources of information, and factual understanding (e.g. being able to recall the local mayor’s name and the political parties in the Bolivian Senate). (see figure 4.1) The Knowledge Index made it possible to divide students into four categories: ranging from those with ‘minimal knowledge’ (1 on the knowledge index scale) to others who could demonstrate they had ‘excellent knowledge’ (4 on the knowledge index scale).

Based on the way identity politics are have been represented in the recently approved new constitution, respondents were then quizzed about the extent to which they supported the new constitutional provisions associated with identity politics, (i.e. remedying political and economic marginalization of indigenous communities). They were invited to examine a range of responses and to choose the one that most nearly closely reflected their own views, indicating whether they totally agreed; partially agreed; partially disagreed or totally disagreed with the passage of six indicative articles in the new constitution that may be associated directly with the politics of identity.

These consisted of: (i) Establishment of an intercultural and multilingual education system; (ii) Recognition of indigenous peoples’ traditions and knowledge; (iii) Legal protection of land that the indigenous population regarded as traditionally sacred; (iv) The right to have a ethnic origin acknowledged on passports or identity cards; (v) Recognition of the indigenous ‘Whiphala’ an additional ‘dual’ national symbol, and (vi) Redistribution of land in favour of indigenous farmers (Box 1.1).

Measuring the influence of identity politics on the knowledge dimension of the KAP-model required carrying out a number of statistical exercises (see Figure 1.1). Initially, an examination was made of the correlation between the knowledge index and the six variables concerning identity politics that were amalgamated into the Identity Politics Index’. Using *Cohen’s Kappa coefficient*²⁵ and the *Kendall’s Tau coefficient*²⁶ it was possible to gauge whether there existed a correlation and if so, how strong it was. The only identity politics variable with a significant correlation with the knowledge index was ‘Recognition of

²⁵ This is a statistical measure of inter-rated agreement for qualitative data. It gives a score of how much homogeneity or consensus there is in the given ratings. Kappa is always between 0 (no agreement) and 1 (complete agreement)


²⁶ This is a non-parametric statistic used to measure the degree of correspondence between two rankings and assessing the significance of this correspondence. (Kendall’s Tau is always between -1 (100% negative association) and 1 (100% positive association).

indigenous traditions and Knowledge’, consequently there was also a very low correlation for the relation between the Identity Politics Index and the Knowledge Index. Kendall’s Tau-c (0.111) showed that there is virtually no association between identity politics and the degree of knowledge; regression analysis confirmed a very low correlation of 2.4%. This outcome indicated that identity politics had very little influence on knowledge about politics of students in La Paz and El Alto.

5.2 The Attitude Dimension Influenced by Identity Politics

The attitude index was made by connecting a number of variables, including: satisfaction with democracy; satisfaction with governmental policies; trust in institutions, and trust in fellow citizens. (Figure 4.4) These were encoded numerically: students with a very negative attitude scored 1 on the scale of 1 to 5; students who scored 5 were judged to have a very positive attitude. The outcome indicated that the majority of the students registered around mid-point on the scale, and may be generally regarded as having either a neutral or positive attitude.

To calculate the influence of identity politics on the attitude of students, a similar process was undertaken to that which has already been recorded in Section 5.1. The relationship between Attitude and Identity Politics turned out to be stronger than for Knowledge because Kendall’s Tau-b registered 0,410. Since a high score on the Identity Politics scale indicated positive attitude, the results implied a considerable degree of positive association between the two indices. Thus, students who demonstrated positive attitudes towards the identity politics of Evo Morales also had a more positive attitude towards political matters in general. The latter may represent a logical outcome arising from the incorporation of identity politics into the national programme of the Bolivian government. Regression analysis revealed that 23,2% of student attitudes were influenced by the politics of identity and the degree of influence was charted in Figure 5.1.



5.3 The Practice Dimension Influenced by Identity Politics

As with the dimensions Knowledge and Attitude, an index was constructed from accumulated research data to calculate Practice and depicted in the form of a bar diagram. (Figure 4.6) The initial index was created by synthesising the variables: participation in manifestations; organisations and petitions, and participation in voting activity (n.b. not voting preference). As with the calculation of other indices, the students were scored on a scale ranging from 1 to 5 .

The relation between the Identity Politics index and the Practice dimension of Political Culture was more restricted than for the Attitude dimension. Kendall’s Tau-b, used to establish the relationship between the Identity Politics index and the Practice index was only 0,180. This indicates that there was a small but positive association between identity politics and the nature and level of political participation. The participation in political activity is defined by identity politics for only 4.1% of students. The percentage is small but sufficient enough to maintain that identity politics exercised some influence on the Practice dimension of Political Culture.

5.4 The Influence of Identity Markers on Identity Politics

In examining the influence of class, ethnicity and gender on their views about identity politics, students were asked to record their opinions about articles in the new Constitution that favoured the indigenous population. Using statistical tests in SPSS, there was a significant correlation between students’ social class and Identity Politics. (Table 5.1)

	Low Class	Middle Class	High Class
Intercultural and multilingual education system	60%	41%	35%
Recognition of Indigenous traditions and knowledge	53%	41%	12%
Protection of Sacred land	71%	44%	17%
Ethnic origin on passport or ID	47%	24%	5%
Whiphala as national symbol	54%	20%	9%
Redistribution of land	55%	51%	13%

The difference in opinion between students from a lower class background and their fellow upper class students is clear and unequivocal, especially in their respective responses to the issues of the protection of Sacred land, the adoption of the whiphala as a ‘dual’ (additional) Bolivian national symbol, and the opportunity to record the bearer’s ethnicity on a passport or identity card. The impression that there must be an association between class and identity politics was strengthened by statistical tests on the correlation. (Appendix 2.1) Phi=0,621 indicated that there was a high probability that students from a lower social class background were inclined to regard the whiphala acceptable as a national symbol.²⁷ This was also the

²⁷ The Whiphala is a multi-coloured, chequered flag or emblem, symbolically representing the indigenous peoples of the Central Andes and Bolivian Amazon regions.

case with reference to other variables linking Class and Identity Politics, most of which showed a moderate-strong correlation.

This second indicator of identity, Recognition of Indigenous traditions and knowledge stirs very strong emotional reactions in Bolivian society because over half the population identify themselves with about thirty indigenous tribal groups, ethnic differentiation has always been a major social and political issue in Bolivia. The student respondents were each assigned into one of three separate categories: half of them classified as mestizos; 18,7% defined themselves as (Europeanised) white, and 28% Aymará. Although there were also students from some indigenous communities, including Quechua students, the latter constituted barely 3.3% of respondents. For the overall purpose of this thesis, they were excluded because they were neither statistically significant nor were the students a particularly representative of Bolivia’s 2.2 million Quechua population.

In considering the tabulation of Ethnicity and Identity Politics, there are clear and significant differences between these three groups. (Table 5.2). The percentage of the white people is virtually identical with the percentage of high class students, a direct reflection of Bolivian civil society in which three-quarters of the wealthiest 20% of the population, claiming 63.5% of the national income, are white descendents of European immigrants. Similar ethnicity/class correlations are also observable between the mestizo and middle class, and for Aymará and the low (social and economic) class. Though there is a significant difference independently between the correlation of ‘class and identity politics’ and the correlation of ‘ethnicity and identity politics’, statistical analysis confirmed that for the respondents there was less connection between ethnicity and their opinion about identity politics than there was between class and political views. In the analysis of Ethnicity and Identity Politics data, only three of the six variables display a significant correlation: opinion about the ethnic origin on passport or ID card ($\Phi=0,419$); opinion about the whiphala as national symbol ($\Phi=0,513$), and views about redistribution of land ($\Phi=0,479$).

Table 5.2: Ethnicity and Identity Politics			
	White	Mestizo	Aymará
Intercultural and multilingual education system	37,5%	38,7%	65,5%
Recognition of Indigenous traditions and knowledge	14,3%	30%	58,3%
Protection of Sacred land	17,1%	38,7%	72,6%
Ethnic origin on passport or ID	7,1%	20%	47,6%
Whiphala as national symbol	12,5%	17,3%	56%
Redistribution of land	12,5%	33,3%	67,9%

However important gender may be in the formation of a person’s identity, it did not emerge as a significant ‘filter’ in relation to Identity politics. Not even one of the statements had a significant Chi-Square, rendering unnecessary measurement of degree of the correlation with Phi or Cramer’s V. Data gathered from male and female students produced nearly identical outcomes, other than for the responses to the variable: Protection of Sacred land, which was viewed positively by a significantly greater percentage of women than men.(Table 5.3) Otherwise, in terms of gender there is a broad consensus between the sexes in their opinions about the Morales’ identity politics.

Table 5.3: Gender and Identity Politics		
	Men	Women
Intercultural and multilingual education system	43,7%	47%
Recognition of Indigenous traditions and knowledge	36,4%	34,2%
Protection of Sacred land	39,1%	49%
Ethnic origin on passport or ID	22,5%	28,2%
Whiphala as national symbol	28,5%	26,8%
Redistribution of land	40,4%	38,9%

6

Jallalla el Pueblo! ²⁸

Drawing mostly on qualitative data, this chapter examines the nature and depiction and impact of identity politics in Bolivia since 2006, focussing on student opinion about the foundation and development of identity politics in Bolivia; the representation of identity politics is represented and its effects on civil society. In addition to qualitative data gathered from in-depth interviews with students; a political scientist; a political philosopher; a focus group, and notes generated by participant observation, selective use has been made of references to perspectives expressed about Morales and change in Bolivia that have been voiced by Hugo Moldiz, a Bolivian journalist.

6.1 The Growing Success of Identity Politics in Bolivia

Although ethnicity was already an important issue during protests of the indigenous population since 2000, identity politics only become an important part of the national government’s policy after Evo Morales was elected president in December 2005. During his inauguration speech on the 22nd of January 2006 it became abundantly clear that the major project of his administration would be the enactment of a new constitution which to put an end to the marginalization and discrimination of Bolivia’s indigenous population. With the passage of new constitution, approved via the January 2009 referendum, Bolivia was defined as a plurinational state, in which the social and ethnic diversity of the population was acknowledged; power was to be devolved away from bureaucratic central government and mutuality between constituent communities was to be fostered. Morales’ programme offered greater autonomy and economic redress for Bolivia’s indigenous population. The new constitution terminated landlordism (land redistribution had been proceeding intermittently since 1952); neo-liberalism and neo-colonialism.

Morales’ symbolic status and historic references were undeniable. For the first time in the history of the country a Bolivian president officially recognized the suffering of the indigenous peoples that had been endured during 500 years of colonialism, and the new constitution appeared to endorse the economic redress that featured strongly in his inaugural address as president.

Morales’ undertaking was also politically significant because the previous twenty years of right-wing administrations caused great disappointment and frustration for many Bolivians. Since the end of the corrupt and extremely brutal military dictatorship of Luís García Meza in 1981 and an ensuing period of military intervention, Bolivian governments have been democratically elected. However, the succession of democratic governments pursued the conservative neo-liberal economic model promoted by Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher, with disastrous consequences for the Bolivian population. (Moldiz 2009, 24) Neo-liberalism, as practised by the governments of President Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (1993-1997 and 2002-2003) involved privatisation of the national mine industry and the transformation of several nationally owned enterprises into transnational companies.(28) Public anger about privatization and associated corruption erupted into massive protests when Lozada attempted to sell (at a loss) Bolivian gas to the United States. Bolivians, principally the poor indigenous population and farmers, took to the streets and in cities like

²⁸ Translation: ‘Long live the people’.

La Paz, mass demonstrations continued for days at a time and eventually forced Lozada to resign.

During the course of an in-depth interview, the Bolivian philosopher Pablo Pérez Ayala, summarized the reasons why Bolivians no longer believed in neo-liberal, right-wing parties:

Durante veinte años de democracia, tomaban el poder grupos de clase media y alto, de gente mestizo o blanca, gente preparada que han estudiado en Harvard y otros lugares, gente de tendencias en centro-derecho y neoliberales. Pero durante estos veinte años la gente de estos gobiernos no han hecho grandes aportes a Bolivia.²⁹

When questioned about this issue, in other interviews students and experts answered that the frustration of the population about the inability of Lozada’s and other governments to act in the best interests of the country was one of the major reasons why identity politics became so important in Bolivia. In the elections of December 2005, the majority of the population, who had enough of right-wing governments decided to support Morales, the *Indio* candidate, who might be ‘unlearned’ and ‘illiterate’ but who were at least was more patriotic and who really wanted the best for the country.

In addition to popular disappointment with neo-liberal policies, personal identification with Evo Morales played an important role in the progress of identity politics. This is especially true for the impoverished indigenous population, few of whom had either the necessary educational qualifications or could even afford to study at university.

Of the students whom responded to the questionnaire, 31.4% (n=300) defined themselves as being indigenous, principally Aymará (28.1%), the largest indigenous population group in the western part of the country.³⁰ Most of these indigenous students, whether Aymará or Quechua were not as well off as their mestizo and white fellow students. As was evident from their voting behaviour, the majority of indigenous students supported Morales. (Tables 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6) Only a tiny percentage of indigenous students (5%) voted against Morales.³¹

The appeal of Morales identity politics was not limited to the indigenous population, Bolivia’s poor also identified with a president they regarded as one of their own, as one of the respondents declared, ‘Evo es un fruto de la clase popular’³² Morales was born in a poor farmer’s family and as a small child he was forced to learn Spanish in primary school. He did not finish his education and as a consequence Morales still has difficulties with reading and writing and reading. The president’s personal history has aspects that reflect the miserable economic realities of Bolivia’s masses and also many students own life experiences or the experiences of their parents.

²⁹ Translation: ‘During twenty years of democracy, power was in hands of middle and upper class, white and mestizo people, people with a good education, who had studied in Harvard and other places, people with centre-right and neo-liberal ideas. But during these twenty years the people of these governments have not made great contributions to Bolivia.’

³⁰ As has already been stated, remaining 3.3% indigenous students were Quechua.

³¹ As has already been noted 2.4% of indigenous students did not vote, principally because they were too young and either disenchanted or uninterested in voting.

³² ‘Evo is fruit of the lower class.’

6.2 Representation of Identity Politics in Bolivian Society

From personal observation (having been an exchange student in La Paz in 2004-2005), it has been relatively easy to note some of the changes in Bolivian society. For example, indigenous people are more prominently represented than ever before; they occupy more high status jobs than before and there is a general impression that indigenous peoples’ self-esteem has developed. However, the responses from in-depth interviews, via which it was intended to gather an informed view from students about the impact of the identity politics yielded in the majority of cases a rather negative reaction to how respondents regarded the representation of identity politics.

Although Morales’ administration refers to identity politics and does not openly discriminate in favour of any one group, some students referred instead to ethnic politics. They argued that government policies were not promoting a national Bolivian identity but only focused on the indigenous ethnicity (Aymará, Quechua, Guaraníes and other, smaller ethnic populations). Instead of creating unification among the diverse populations of Bolivia the president, they maintained, was differentiating between Bolivians, destroying the feeling of an authentic, national Bolivian identity. Some respondents criticized the president for using ethnicity as a political instrument to politically manipulate the indigenous population and get more votes in the elections. The students’ criticism appeared rather contradictory, because Morales could only have been elected with support from non-indigenous as well as indigenous populations. Focussing solely on ethnic policies that were only intended to benefit indigenous voters would not have secured the crucially important electoral support of the non-indigenous middle class. However, in the five years that have elapsed between 2004-5 (when I lived as an exchange student in Bolivia) and 2009, electoral support for Morales had been challenged by critics who complain that his government focuses too much on satisfying the demands of the indigenous population. As a consequence, in the December 2009 presidential elections, Morales may be disadvantaged by loss of support from the disillusioned mestizo and white voters.

Some interviewees also believed that the promotion of identity politics and references to concepts like race and ethnicity were used as a means to secure political power. During the course of an interview with Pablo Pérez Ayala, the philosopher stated that during Morales’ presidency some governmental institutions had become intolerant and discriminatory. He maintained that politicians had become fixated about the importance of the ‘andino-part’ (Andean) region as the most important part of Bolivia. Alaya argued that Bolivian society was being reconfigured by the promotion of ‘Andinocentrism’, which failed to take account of the heterogeneous character and development of Bolivian society. He insisted that ‘Andinocentrism’ was simplistic, political and social interaction could not be reduced to model consisting of a society of pure, original, indigenous people versus undesirable mestizo and white people. He concluded that it was dangerous to use identity as a political instrument because instead of the government being engaged in searching for the national identity it was creating differentiation and separation between Bolivians.

In contrast with the negative interpretation of identity politics, other interviewees drew attention to some positive developments. The identity politics promoted by Morales have stimulated a massive review of Bolivian culture, the authenticity of which had been denied, ill-judged and suppressed for decades. The promotion of identity politics also encouraged ‘decolonization’ of Bolivia’s history, shifting attention away from the ‘civilizing’ impact of European settlement, drawing attention to pre-Hispanic, indigenous technological and scientific achievements that were destroyed by the invaders. For political scientists like Mirko Rodríguez, the ‘decolonization’ has generated recognition of Aymara culture. In an interview with Rodríguez, he drew attention to the visionary, mythical aspect of Aymara

culture, which he explained was totally different to modern, Western perspectives about the world. Rodriguez states that the visionary aspect could prove helpful, stimulating and enrich scientific perspectives and would encourage diverse and plural scientific development. He envisaged the latter to be a synthetic development, adding: ‘descolonizar no significa agarrar nuestra ropa de hace 500 años’.³³ Moreover, as Rodriguez also noted, the revaluation of the indigenous culture, enshrined in the provisions of the new constitution also formally acknowledged the importance of traditional knowledge and medicines.

There is no easy way of accommodating the sharp differences between the negative and positive views about the significance and representation of the indigenous culture in the Bolivian society. At best, it may be argued that it may be the influence of respondents own, personal understanding and interpretation of culture and cultural exclusivity. For some political scientists, attention being paid indigenous culture it appears to be a threat to the fragile and unstable nation state. Others did not regard the emergence of alternative, non-Western perspectives as a threat but instead as an enrichment and a supplementary source of cultural inspiration.

6.3 Outcomes of the Identity Politics in Bolivia

‘Matar Kollas es hacer patria’³⁴, was written as graffiti on a wall in the city centre of Sucre, a city in the valleys of Bolivia. It was an extremely hostile reference to the highlanders (Kollas), and lends graphic (albeit anecdotal) credence to the negative outcome identity politics, which critics say has fostered discrimination and racism.

Discrimination in Bolivia manifests itself in various forms, along inter- and intra-ethnic, regional and social lines: Cambas³⁵ against Kollas³⁶; indigenous people against the mestizo and white population; city-dwellers against the peasantry, and of course, on the basis of social class. While students were keen to draw attention to these dimensions of discrimination as a major outcome of the identity politics, it can also be maintained that discrimination and racism were also the legacies of the polarisation of Bolivian society over many generations. Identifying the extent to which identity politics may have contributed to polarisation is a difficult and complex issue to address.

This is primarily because discrimination between Bolivian citizens is nonlinear and any attempt to broker antagonism invariable demands an almost impossible balancing act by would-be mediators. While discussing the development of racism and discrimination in Bolivia, during an in-depth interview, a student of political science argued that the solution lay in coming to come to terms with the past:

La solución para esta problema de discriminación tiene que ver con la negación con el pasado y solo podemos solucionar eso con una reconciliación con el pasado. Es aceptar lo que nos ha pasado. No con alegría, si no simplemente aceptar. Porque eso es lo que nos hace falta, digamos.³⁷

³³ ‘Decolonization does not mean we have to wear again the clothes of 500 years ago.’

³⁴ ‘Killing Kollas is patrimonial’: graffiti in the city centre of Sucre. ‘Patria’, literally means ‘Where I come from’, Absi & Cruz, p. 2

³⁵ Inhabitants of the lowlands of Bolivia: departments of Pando, Beni, Santa Cruz and Tarija.

³⁶ Inhabitants of the highlands and part of the valley: departments of La Paz, Oruro, Potosí, Cochabamba and Chuquisaca.

³⁷ ‘The solution for this problem has everything to do with the denial of the past and we can only solve this by reconciling [ourselves] with the past. We have to accept what has happened. Not with joy but simple acceptance. Because, let’s say, this is what we need’ (Esther Eunice).

She was not alone, for many of her fellow students also drew attention to the need for an historic reconciliation with Bolivia’s colonial history as the key to resolving problems associated with secessionism, racism and discrimination.

Many concluded that it was a miscalculation by Evo Morales to believe that identity politics represented the solution for social and economic problems. His student-critics insist that it is not productive to continue to draw attention to the legacies of colonialism and to use the concept of ‘identity’ in an oversimplified way. Students enrolled at the private university (UPB) were convinced that political discourse about identity politics was based on the idea that the mestizo and white citizens ought to have to pay an indemnity bill for historically marginalizing the indigenous population for decades. However, it was been impossible for them to produce any evidence that Evo Morales has ever made a public statement during his presidency.

Morales student-supporters during their interviews stated that the president was not drawing attention to the need for historic restitution, instead they point out that his administration was highlighting a reality that had always been ignored or denied by previous Bolivian governments. It amounted, they said, to a positive acknowledgement of the great diversity that exists and has always existed in Bolivian society. Students from all classes engaged in discourse that was informed by the divisions and references that tend to suggest that identity politics may be the latest synthesis in a persistent, complex web of racism and discrimination that bedevils social intercourse in Bolivia.

6.4 Long Live The People

‘Jallalla el Pueblo’, is a graffito scribbled on one of the walls of the Public University in El Alto. It translates approximately as ‘long live the people’ and is an inspirational cry associated with the victory of the indigenous population in their constant struggle to be heard by the several governments of Bolivia during the last two decades.³⁸ Morales election and the policies of his administration can be regarded as an extension of the struggle; as both a material and symbolic advance for the Bolivian lower classes and evidence of the practical implementation of identity politics.

In analysing the findings of research into student opinion about identity politics as well as in-depth interviews and focus group discussion, a rather negative reaction to identity politics emerged. Given the elite associations and the generally hostile attitudes by wealthy Bolivians towards Morales, a negative tone in the response of upper class students would have been unexceptional. However, given their background, it was rather surprising that the indigenous students enrolled at El Alto were almost equally negative in their views.

Via personal observation of the students and further consideration about identity politics, it has been possible to advance an explanation for the students’ collective pessimism. There are two aspects to government policies concerning identity politics, involving not only the revaluation of indigenous culture but also the everyday realities of life for the young indigenous students. The latter, as Willem and Salman point out, involves indigenous female students preferring to wear jeans instead of the traditional *pollera*, and many students preferring to develop a good command of spoken and written English rather than learning a traditional indigenous language. There is no readily identifiable, single point of reconciliation for these contradictions, other than to observe that the students’ pessimistic

³⁸ ‘Jallalla’, [Live!] is an imperative that is a call to arms, a call to drink, as well as a salutation that is widely used by the Aymara and Quechua.

response is their manner of coming to terms with greater and more enduring intellectual debates concerning ideology and everyday life; traditional culture and modernity. That their presence in university testifies to individual, and by extension indigenous emancipation, is evident but in their response to Morales, the indigenous students may also be both embracing and embodying a modernity in which they see no place for ethnic polarization – a feature they notice intermittently in discourse promoted by Morales' identity politics.



Conclusion

This research was originally prompted by personal experience of the process of change under Morales' rule, and the recognition that he had exercised a strong influence on Bolivian society, much of which was connected with the role and enactment of identity politics. The locus of research involved examining and analysing the relationship between identity politics and the political culture of Bolivian university students.

In examining the political culture of students in La Paz and El Alto, use was made of the 'political culture theory' of Almond and Verba (1965) and for the purposes of analysis, the KAP-model was adapted to examine three aspects of their political culture. The 'knowledge dimension' yielded an insights about students' political awareness based on factual knowledge; interest in politics, and the frequency with which they referred to sources of information about daily news. Even though students regarded themselves as very interested in politics, frequently reading newspapers or watching TV news bulletins, it did not appear to be reflected in their knowledge about the factual aspects of politics. This was especially noticeable from the responses by students enrolled at the public university of El Alto (UPEA) and the private university of La Paz (UPB) and it appears that there was a great difference between being interested and actually having a developed knowledge about Bolivian politics. Hence, being interested in politics did not always mean that students were politically well informed..

The second dimension of identity politics that was analysed using the KAP-model was students' attitude towards politics. In addition to examining their attitude towards democracy and governmental output, it was important to examine their beliefs and the level they consider themselves members of the nation-state and also their trust and identification with their fellow citizens.

Almond and Verba (1965) drew attention to the importance of this issue in countries in which political change was taking place. For the process of change to succeed in Bolivia, its citizens needed generally to develop a strong and positive attitude towards the nation-state, aided and abetted by better integration of the indigenous population. Although student respondents were generally proud to be Bolivian, there were significant differences between students of various indigenous backgrounds regarding their satisfaction with democracy and government policies. Students who identified themselves as indigenous (Aymará and Quechua), were more satisfied with the current political developments; they had greater trust in institutions, and they generally had a more positive views than white or mestizo students. However, students with indigenous backgrounds exhibited a low level of trust in fellow citizens and it may be concluded that the differences in students' attitudes were associated with their identification with Evo Morales. Indigenous students recognized their personal interest in the policies of the Morales government and therefore maintained a generally more positive attitude to political developments than white and mestizo fellow students, who feel themselves disregarded by the government.

The final dimension of political culture that was examined was students' practical involvement in politics and political practices, exemplified participation in political activism and voting behaviour. Participation in political organizations and manifestations (including political protests and rallies) is again intimately connected with students' ethnicity. Aymará students participated more actively and intensively in manifestations and organizations, possibly because of their enrolment at a highly politicized university. The positive attitude and involvement in the political culture by indigenous students rendered it logical that more would vote in favour of Morales than their white and mestizo fellow students. It is reasonable

to conclude that generally positive attitude results in a political action (including voting) in support of the government.

In turning attention to the characteristics of identity politics, reflection tended to view them as corresponding with a policy of inclusion, remedying the marginalization of the indigenous population and simultaneously incorporating them in the political sphere. Bolivian students do not generally accept at face value the identity politics of Morales and regarded it as part of a strategy to mobilize political support for MAS, and some students had reservations about the socially divisive consequences of identity politics. The pessimism expressed towards identity politics by indigenous students may be accounted for by stark differences between their personal reality or everyday lives and the abstract ideological construct represented by identity politics. Indigenous students were not particularly interested in the special status and rights for the indigenous population, though they maintain respect for the Aymará culture and they are proud to be Aymará. However, they did not necessarily feel the need for special group rights to integrate themselves in Bolivian society, all they appeared to want was the opportunity to study, get recognized qualifications and get a good job. The indigenous students did not reject their own culture but they do not agree with the differentiation created by identity politics.

In testing the idea that indicators of identity, specifically: class, gender and ethnicity could function as a filter between identity politics and political culture, research appeared to confirm that there was a noticeable correspondence between class and ethnicity with the opinion about identity politics independent from the three dimensions of political culture. However, the identity indicator associated with gender did not appear to be at all influential as a factor in determining the level of response to opinion about identity politics. Students from the lower class who also identified themselves with being Aymará had positive views about identity politics; white high class students were more disposed to think negatively about identity politics.

In order to answer the central research question it was necessary to have an idea about the composition of the political culture and students’ beliefs about identity politics before going on to examine the role of identity politics within the political culture. The role or influence of identity politics was found to be strongest in the attitude dimension of political culture and the lowest in relation to knowledge. This finding was quite logical because students’ opinions about identity politics tended to be intuitive, rather than being based on real knowledge.

Concerning the direction of influence, it was concluded that the dimensions of the KAP-model, principally attitude, have as much influence on opinion about identity politics as vice versa. The composition of political culture cannot be seen as a simple effect of the promotion of identity politics and that identity politics are not the only influence in determining political culture.

The relationship between identity politics and political culture appears to be reciprocal and akin to a self-reinforcing circle. This means that political culture cannot be explicitly identified in one of the six behaviour change sequences of the KAP-model. However, because of the significant link between identity politics and attitude, it is very likely to assume that the ‘affinity model’ or the ‘emotional model’ are the two possible behaviour change sequences applicable on the political culture of students in La Paz and El Alto. Both models favour the attitude of students being the point of commencement for acquiring knowledge about politics and involvement in political action. The difference between these models lies in the fact that the affinity model presumes that attitude leads to knowledge gain, rather than the initiation of practice, whereas the emotional model takes for granted that knowledge gain is the final dimension in the sequence.

The overall conclusion of this research is that the political culture of students in La Paz and El Alto is mainly influenced by a correspondence between student attitudes and identity politics, and that the relationship between identity politics and political culture is reciprocal, self-reinforcing circle, influenced by identity politics and the three dimensions of political culture.



Recommendations

Aside from being almost certain that the respondents will change their views and activities, because of the scope of the sample' it is unwise to generalise about the application of its conclusions to refer to more than the students who took part in the research. Moreover, the great differences between departments in the highlands of Bolivia and those in the valleys and lowlands would have probably produced very different results if research were conducted in other regions or at universities other than those at La Paz and El Alto. It is not therefore possible to extrapolate and refer to 'all the Bolivian students', for example.

However, these reservations do not mean that the influence or role of identity politics within their political culture would be different elsewhere than it was for the subjects of this research. Consequently, it would be interesting to conduct similar research on a bigger scale across other regions of Bolivia in order to compare data and between students of different regions. This would produce more reliable information about the influence of identity politics on the political culture of students. In terms of polarisation in Bolivia, it would be useful in contributing to public debate by drawing attention to a politically moderate but important segment of the population, the students. The importance of the students lies in their potential to act as agents of compromise and the fact that as intelligent, educated young people, it is from their ranks that Bolivia may select its future leadership.



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Appendix 1: La Media Luna



A ppendix 2: Political Culture of Students

1.1 Correlation between ethnicity and interest in politics.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by	Phi	.249	.029
Nominal	Cramer's V	.144	.029
N of Valid Cases		300	

a Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis

1.2 Important sources of information

Importance of sources of information		
	Important	Not Important
Television	67%	33%
Newspaper	30,7%	69,3%
Radio	20%	80%
Internet	16%	84%
Family	12,7%	87,3%
Friends	5%	95%

1.3 Correlation between ethnicity and satisfaction with democracy.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by	Phi	.488	.000
Nominal	Cramer's V	.282	.000
N of Valid Cases		300	

a Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis

A ppendix 3: Identity politics and political culture

2.1. Correlation between class and identity politics

- class and opinion about the protection of sacred land

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	78.401(a)	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	86.155	8	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	26.085	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	300		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 6.67.

Symmetric Measures

	Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal Phi	.511	.000
Cramer's V	.361	.000
N of Valid Cases	300	

a Not assuming the null hypothesis.

b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

- class and opinion about writing ethnicity in passport

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	77.194(a)	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	78.879	8	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	27.256	1	.000
N of Valid Cases	300		

a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.33.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.507	.000
	Cramer's V	.359	.000
N of Valid Cases		300	

- a Not assuming the null hypothesis.
- b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.

- class and opinion about the whiphala as national symbol

Chi-Square Tests

	Value	df	Asymp. Sig. (2-sided)
Pearson Chi-Square	115.762(a)	8	.000
Likelihood Ratio	124.879	8	.000
Linear-by-Linear Association	53.627	1	.000
N of Valid Cases		300	

- a 0 cells (.0%) have expected count less than 5. The minimum expected count is 10.00.

Symmetric Measures

		Value	Approx. Sig.
Nominal by Nominal	Phi	.621	.000
	Cramer's V	.439	.000
N of Valid Cases		300	

- a Not assuming the null hypothesis.
- b Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.



Appendix 4: The questionnaire

Estimado/a estudiante,

En el contexto de mis estudios en la Universidad de Nimega (Radboud Universiteit), realizo un estudio sobre la cultura política de los estudiantes en Bolivia. Esta encuesta tiene por objetivo a coleccionar más información con respecto a este tema. Estoy muy agradecida por su participación y si hay dudas sobre cualquier tema, estoy siempre dispuesta a responder sus preguntas!

Miet Chielens

A. Datos Demográficos

1. Sexo: Hombre Mujer
2. Edad: _____
 Blanco
 Mestizo
 Aymará
 Mestizo
 otro _____
 El Alto La Paz
3. Etnicidad:
4. Domicilio:
5. Universidad: _____
6. Carrera : _____

B. Cultura Política

7. Cuánto está Usted interesado en política?
 Muy interesado Algo interesado
 Poco interesado No interesado
8. Dónde obtiene Usted la información más confiable de las noticias diaria?
 Televisión Periódico Familia Otro:
 Internet Radio Amigos _____
9. Usted ha votado por Evo Morales en las elecciones nacionales de diciembre 2005?
 Si No No he votado
10. En Agosto hubo el referéndum revocatorio para decidir si Morales podría permanecer como presidente o no. Usted ha votado a favor o en contra de la continuidad de Morales?
 A favor de Morales En contra Morales No he votado

11. Usted ha participado en una manifestación, marcha o protesta pública en los últimos 12 meses?

Si No

12. Usted participa en una organización o movimiento que se ocupa con la política?

Si, _____ (nombre de la organización)
 No

13. Usted ha participado en una reunión política en los últimos 12 meses?

Si No

14. Usted ha firmado una petición en los últimos 12 meses?

Si No

15. Cuánta confianza tiene Usted en los siguientes actores?

	No confianza	Poca confianza	confianza	Mucha confianza	Sin opinión
a. Miembros del Congreso Nacional					
b. Los partidos políticos					
c. El presidente					
d. Grandes empresarios					
e. Estudiantes de esta universidad					
f. Estudiantes de otra universidad					
g. Sus vecinos					
h. Habitantes de La Paz					
i. Habitantes de El Alto					

16. Con qué frecuencia...

	Varias veces por día	Una vez por día	Varias veces por semana	Casi nunca o nunca
a. ...escucha Usted las noticias en la radio?				
b. ...ve Usted noticias en la televisión?				
c. ...lee Usted noticias en el Internet?				
d. ...lee Usted noticias en el periódico?				

17. En la escala política de la extrema izquierda a extrema derecha, dónde se sitúa Usted?

Izquierda	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	Derecha

18. Cómo se llama el alcalde de La Paz y como se llama el alcalde de El Alto?

La Paz: _____ No lo sé

El Alto: _____ No lo sé

19. Cuáles son los partidos políticos presente en la Camara de Senadores?

20. Usted ha leído (partes de) la Nueva Constitución?

Si No

21. Puede Usted indicar su opinión sobre las siguientes afirmaciones?

	Totalmente de acuerdo	Parcialmente de acuerdo	Parcialmente en desacuerdo	Totalmente en desacuerdo	Sin opinión
a. No hay democracia en Bolivia.					
b. El poder político se concentra en muy pocas manos.					
c. Los políticos están dispuestos a mentir para ser elegidos.					
d. Confío en que los resultados del referéndum de Agosto son correctos.					
e. Para el progreso de Bolivia es necesario que Evo Morales límite la voz de la oposición.					
f. El presidente Morales debe tener el poder necesario para que sea capaz de actuar en favor de nuestros intereses.					
g. Estoy orgulloso/a de ser Boliviano/a.					
h. Si una ley injusta sea aprobada por el gobierno, no puedo hacer nada para cambiarlo.					
i. La redistribución de tierras a campesinos pobres es necesario.					
j. La whiphala es un símbolo nacional de Bolivia.					
k. Quiero que mi origen étnico esté inscrito en mi pasaporte.					
l. La tierra sagrada de la población indígena debe ser protegida.					
m. Los conocimientos tradicionales, medicinas tradicionales, lenguas y ritos de la población indígena deben ser admitidos oficialmente.					
n. Un sistema educativo intercultural y plurilingüe significa un progreso para el país.					

22. Usted estaría dispuesto/a a participar en el futuro en un entrevista personal para conversar un poco más acerca de su opinión política?

Si No

En el caso que Usted respondió “Si”, por favor escriba su dirección y número telefónico dónde pueda contactarse.

Nombre: _____
Dirección: _____
Teléfono fijo: _____
Teléfono Celular: _____

Muchas gracias por su participación en esta investigación!

